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This Response to Professor Ramsey's pro-Congress view of the war powers debate presents
a complete textual and structural theory of a flexible approach to war powerx Under this flexible
system, the President possesses the power to initiate and conduct hostilities as commander-in-chief
and chief executive under Article II of the Constitution, checked by Congress's power of the purse.
The Declare War Clause simply confers on Congress juridical power to both define the United
States's legal relations with other countries and trigger domestic constitutional authorities during
wartime. How the nation goes to war will result from the interaction of the political branches using
these plenary constitutional powers. The Response first critiques Professor Ramsey's historical ac-
coun which does not address the full context of the framing, and next argues that constitutional
text and structure support the flexible war powers system understood by the framing generation.
Critics of this approach fail to appreciate the textual significance of the authority independently
granted to the President by the Commander-in-Chief and Executive Power Clauses and the "en-
gage in War" language of Article I, Section 10. In addition, they do not appreciate the manner in
which the Constitution structures the interaction of executive and legislative branches by creating
strict processes with carefully defined roles for the President and Congress, as with the enactment
of legislation, in contrast to areas where it does not, as with warmaking. A more comprehensive
reading of the text and structure demonstrates that the Constitution does not mandate a specifi4 le-
galistic process for waging war. Instead, the Constitution vests the executive and legislative
branches with different powers involving war, which the President and Congress may use to coop-
erate or to compete for control over warmaking.
INTRODUCrION
In a series of articles, I have criticized the view that the original
understanding of the Constitution requires that Congress provide its
authorization before the United States can engage in military hostili-
ties. This "pro-Congress" position ignores the constitutional text and
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1 See John C. Yoo, Kosovo, War Powers and the Multilateral Future, 148 U Pa L Rev 1673,
1686-1704 (2000) (discussing the original understanding of war powers in the context of the
Kosovo conflict); John C. Yoo, Clio at War: The Misuse of History in the War Powers Debate, 70 U
Colo L Rev 1169, 1221 (1999) (arguing that "the Constitution provides for a flexible arrange-
ment of foreign affairs powers within some fairly broad parameters"); John C. Yoo, The Con-
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structure, errs in interpreting the ratification history of the Constitu-
tion, and cannot account for the practice of the three branches of gov-
ernment. Instead of the rigid process advocated by scholars such as
Louis Henkin, John Hart Ely, Louis Fisher, Michael Glennon, and
Harold Koh,2 I have argued that the Constitution creates a flexible
system of war powers. That system provides the President with signifi-
cant initiative as commander-in-chief, while reserving to Congress
ample authority to check executive policy through its power of the
purse. In this scheme, the Declare War Clause confers on Congress a
juridical power, one that both defines the state of international legal
relations between the United States and another country and triggers
domestic constitutional authorities during wartime.3
In Textualism and War Powers, Professor Michael D. Ramsey
agrees with much of my work and does me the honor of recognizing
me as a leading proponent of a pro-executive theory of war powers.
He agrees that pro-Congress scholars have not advanced a convincing
textual defense of their views, and that they have been unable to ex-
plain the historical evidence that favors presidential control over the
initiation of military hostilities. Professor Ramsey even concedes that
by the eighteenth century, formal declarations of war were unneces-
sary to authorize the conduct of military hostilities. Professor Ramsey
acknowledges that the pro-Congress position suffers from a "serious
textual embarrassment," because the constitutional text only grants
Congress "the power 'to declare war,' not the power 'to authorize hos-
tinuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 Cal L Rev
167, 188-296 (1996) (arguing from eighteenth-century British and American sources that the
Constitution does not shift war powers from the President to Congress).
2 See, for example, William M.Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare War,
82 Cornell L Rev 695,700 (1997) ("The Founders intended that the [Declare War] Clause would
vest in Congress principal responsibility for initiating conflict."); Louis Fisher, Presidential War
Power 203 (Kansas 1995) (stating that Congress needs to "rediscover its institutional and consti-
tutional duties" and that "[1legislators must be prepared, and willing, to use the ample powers at
their disposal"); John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its
Aftermath 3 (Princeton 1993) ("The power to declare war was constitutionally vested in Con-
gress" in order to "reduce the number of occasions on which [the United States] would become [
] involved."); Michael J. Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy 81 (Princeton 1990) ("There is no
evidence that the Framers intended to confer upon the President any independent authority to
commit the armed forces to combat, except in order to repel 'sudden attacks."'); Louis Henkin,
Constitutionalism, Democracy, and Foreign Affairs 109 (Columbia 1990) (arguing that Congress
is the "rudder" that steers the Constitution in foreign affairs matters); Harold Hongju Koh, The
National Security Constitution: Sharing Power after the Iran-Contra Affair 158-61 (Yale 1990)
(noting that the trend has been toward increasing executive control but arguing for more bal-
anced power sharing).
3 See Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 204-08,242-50 (cited in note 1).
4 Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U Chi L Rev 1543 (2002).
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tilities,' and it is not immediately clear why the two should be
equated."5
Nonetheless, Professor Ramsey believes that the pro-Congress
school has things right. In fact, his interpretation of the Constitution is
identical to the rest of the pro-Congress camp: Congress must approve
all uses of military force by the President, unless the nation is acting in
its self-defense, because Congress enjoys the sole authority to declare
war. Textualism and War Powers not only revives the usual pro-
Congress reading of the Declare War Clause, but it also relies on the
same interpretation of the drafting of the Clause repeatedly brought
forth by pro-Congress scholars.
What new argument does Professor Ramsey add to the debate?
It is the claim that the pro-Congress view is supported by the writings
of some eighteenth-century European legal writers, who allegedly be-
lieved that war could be declared either by "word" or by "action." The
core of Professor Ramsey's argument is that these writers seemed to
believe that formal declarations of war served no real purpose under
international law, and that their rhetorical use of the phrase "declaring
war" demonstrates that the term, as used in Article I, must have been
meant to give Congress the power to commence hostilities, either
through a formal declaration (declaring by "word") or by launching
an attack (declaring by "action"). Professor Ramsey has reached the
very same destination as Professors Ely, Glennon, Henkin, and Koh;
he has only added an extra twist in the road.
As a result, Professor Ramsey's addition to the pro-Congress ar-
gument does not advance a new understanding of the constitutional
text and structure, or develop a different history of its drafting and
ratification. In fact, he passes over the former, despite his claim of
providing a textual theory of war powers, and fails to respond to the
challenges of the latter. I welcome the opportunity to reply, because it
allows me to develop a more comprehensive explanation of why the
constitutional text and structure create a less legalistic, more flexible
war powers system. Prominent defenders of a pro-executive approach
to war powers generally emphasize the President's functional superi-
ority to Congress in foreign affairs and war.' Others, such as Professor
5 Id at 1552. Oddly, Professor Ramsey goes to great lengths to create daylight between his
reading of the meaning of a declaration of war during the eighteenth century and mine. He reads
my work as concluding that a declaration of war was "prerequisite to the invocation of the laws
of war," id at 1588 & n 176, but admits that elsewhere I view the declaration as a notification of
an existing legal status. In fact, I recognized that different international authorities thought that a
declaration could perform either role; but the important point was that neither function encom-
passed the idea that a declaration was necessary to commence hostilities. See Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev
at 207-08 (cited in note 1).
6 Judge Robert H. Bork has written: "The respective roles of Congress and the president
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Henry Monaghan, have emphasized the practice in which presidents
often have initiated military hostilities without a declaration of war.
Pro-executive scholarship, however, has not offered a detailed textual
and structural examination of war powers. Here I will provide a more
complete textual and structural theory of a flexible approach to war
powers that provides presidents with the authority to initiate hostili-
ties.
It is important to understand what is at stake. Like others in the
pro-Congress camp, Professor Ramsey appears to believe that many
of the wars of the last half-century have violated the Constitution.
Thus, President Truman's use of force in the Korean War, President
Johnson and Nixon's expansion of the Vietnam War,8 and our inter-
ventions in places like Grenada, Panama, Bosnia, and Kosovo, were all
illegal because they were not accompanied by a declaration of war or
its functional equivalent. The implications of Professor Ramsey's
views are not limited merely to the past. We are in the midst of a terri-
ble war against a determined terrorist enemy, one which disregards
the laws of war, operates at a global level, and wields the resources
and capability for violence of a nation-state. Professor Ramsey, like
others who find such significance in the Declare War Clause, would
require the President to receive the permission of Congress before he
could attack such terrorist groups and the nations that harbor or sup-
port them.9 Moreover, as the nation now considers its policy toward
despotic regimes that are developing weapons of mass destruction,
such as Iraq, Professor Ramsey and other pro-Congress advocates
would require Congress to approve a declaration of war or authoriza-
tion, with its attendant public debate, before the President could
launch an attack.
developed according to their structural capacities and limitations. Congress, consisting of 535
members assisted by huge staffs, is obviously incapable of swift, decisive, and flexible action in
the employment of armed force." Robert H. Bork, in L. Gordon Crovitz and Jeremy A. Rabkin,
eds, The Fettered Presidency: Legal Constraints on the Executive Branch Foreward at x (AEI
1989). See also Robert H. Bork, Erosion of the President's Power in Foreign Affairs, 68 Wash U L
Q 693,698 (1990) (noting that the "the War Powers Act is ineffective because it seeks to involve
Congress in something it is institutionally incapable of handling: swift responses with military
force").
7 As Professor Monaghan has observed, a "practice so deeply embedded in our govern-
mental structure should be treated as decisive of the constitutional issue." Henry P. Monaghan,
Presidential War-making, 50 BU L Rev 19,31 (1970 special issue). See also J.Terry Emerson, War
Powers Legislation, 74 W Va L Rev 53, 72 (1971) (arguing that history demonstrates that the
President has broad authority to use military force independently).
8 Assuming for the moment that the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was not itself sufficient to
authorize attacks on North Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia.
9 To date, Congress has only authorized the use of force against terrorists that participated
in the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. See Authori-
zation for Use of Military Force, Pub L No 107-40,115 Stat 224 (2001).
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This response will explain why the constitutional text, structure,
and history establish a different framework, one flexible enough to ac-
commodate the realities of the modern world. Part I begins by ad-
dressing Professor Ramsey's claim that the original understanding
supports a pro-Congress understanding of war powers. It identifies
limitations in Professor Ramsey's use of historical materials, and it ex-
plains why the original understanding of the Constitution, properly
understood, supports a more flexible approach to war powers. Part II
discusses the textual foundations of this system, and Part III examines
its structural imperatives.
I. HISTORICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE PRO-CONGRESS POSITION
Rather than directly addressing the textual and structural argu-
ments in favor of a pro-executive approach to war powers, Professor
Ramsey (like most pro-Congress scholars) relies entirely on history. In
an effort to discern the original understanding of the Declare War
Clause, Professor Ramsey first argues that international legal scholars
of the eighteenth century had come to realize that declarations of war
had almost no purpose. In this regard, he attempts to go beyond my
1996 article in the California Law Review, which found few declara-
tions of war in eighteenth-century British practice and therefore con-
cluded that they were not considered necessary for the initiation of
hostilities.0 Second, he claims that the irrelevance of declarations of
war means that the Declare War Clause actually must confer a far
broader power, because otherwise there was no point in transferring
the authority from the executive to Congress. He then draws the true
meaning of declaring war from rhetorical statements about war by
eighteenth-century thinkers, Locke, and contemporaneous British le-
gal works. He concludes that these thinkers believed the phrase "de-
clare war" to mean beginning a war either by issuing a declaration of
war ("by word") or by simply launching an attack ("by action").
This Part criticizes Professor Ramsey's treatment of the original
understanding. Professor Ramsey's response to pro-executive scholars
is that the meaning of the Declare War Clause is so plain that no re-
sort to contextual evidence is necessary." Professor Ramsey's histori-
cal evidence must clear a high hurdle if it is to overcome the textual
and structural arguments-to be more fully explored in Parts II and
10 See Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 214-17 (cited in note 1).
n See Ramsey, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1602 (cited in note 4). Professor Ramsey's effort to un-
earth the eighteenth-century meaning of "declare war," which consumes most of his article's en-
ergy, seeks to prove that the text's meaning is indeed plain. Of course, if he were right, we would
not have to examine the history at all, and his reliance upon it demonstrates that his textual ar-
guments, such as they are, really do not resolve the question.
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III-in favor of a flexible system characterized by presidential initia-
tive and leadership.
Professor Ramsey's history fails to meet this standard. His ap-
proach to the eighteenth-century materials suffers the symptoms of
"law-office" history. He uses sources incompletely, he does not address
conflicting evidence, he does not examine the historical context of the
evidence, and he neglects the secondary historical works on the pe-
riod. A fundamental lack of historical context leads him to ignore the
significant political and constitutional changes that occurred during
the colonial, revolutionary, and critical periods in early American his-
tory. Professor Ramsey fails to trace developments in American think-
ing about constitutional, foreign affairs, or the war power during the
tumultuous years between the Revolution and the Ratification. As a
result, Professor Ramsey considers Sir Matthew Hale's 1672 com-
ments on declaring war to be as significant as James Madison's more
than a century later.
These problems in his use of history lead Professor Ramsey to
struggle mightily to show that everyone in the Anglo-American world
of the eighteenth century shared the same basic understanding of de-
claring war. Real history simply does not bear this out. Professor
Ramsey overstates the agreement, if there was any, among scholars
concerning declarations of war. Further, he focuses on their rhetorical
uses of "declaring war" while ignoring the specific legal definition
given to the phrase by some of the same authors in the same works.
Professor Ramsey's most serious misstep is his inattention to the ac-
tual events of the constitutional history of the framing generation. He
assumes that the Framers would have been more familiar with the
musings of a Hale or Rutherforth -both of whom, it appears, were
never seriously discussed in the public political literature of the fram-
ing' 2-than with the actual political events that led to the break with
Great Britain and the ratification of the Constitution. Further, Profes-
sor Ramsey ignores clear examples in which the Framers directly drew
upon these events to predict the operation of the Constitution's sys-
tem of war powers. In discovering the original understanding of war
powers, it is more important to reveal how the Framers thought that
the Constitution would work, rather than what distant commentators
rhetorically said about declaring war as an abstract matter.
12 See Donald S. Lutz, The Origins ofAmerican Constitutionalism 141-45 (Louisiana State
1988) (charting sources most cited in American political literature during critical and ratification
periods).
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A. The Standards of History
Professor Ramsey paints his picture on a broad canvas. He seeks
to show that international legal authorities, beginning with Grotius,
extending through Wolff Burlamaqui, and Vattel, and presumably
ending in the ratification, developed the idea that declaring war meant
commencing war either by word or by deed. A more careful examina-
tion of the sources, however, indicates that Professor Ramsey mis-
reads agreement among these observers and has ignored thinkers who
were more important and well-known to the Framers. Professor Ram-
sey also makes serious methodological errors that undermine his con-
clusions. He never examines the nature of Anglo-American constitu-
tional development during the eighteenth century, nor does he seek to
understand the war powers issue as part of the changes in American
political thought that led to the Constitution. Examination of this con-
text shows that Professor Ramsey's story is out-of-step with the his-
tory of the Constitution's ratification.
While the thoughts of various European and British legal schol-
ars on declaring war are interesting, they are not relevant unless in-
corporated into the developments leading to the Constitution's crea-
tion. In other words, it does not matter much what Rutherforth
thought of British war powers practice, or what Bynkershoek believed
to be the Netherlands constitution's war powers, unless we know
whether these ideas actually influenced the framing generation. Fur-
ther, we cannot evaluate the import of these works without under-
standing the broader historical trends of the revolutionary and ratifi-
cation periods. In order to reconstruct the original understanding of
the war power properly, common sense-if not the pleas of legal his-
torians and legal scholars who care about history-tells us that a
scholar must do a good job of using history.
Unfortunately, Professor Ramsey's account does not meet these
standards. First, he does not take an appropriately broad approach to
the primary sources of the ratification period, but instead focuses on
only a narrow sliver-eighteenth-century treatises on international
law, to be exact. Situating the ideas and concepts we argue about to-
day in their historical setting invariably helps us understand more
about them. We can better comprehend the contours and nature of the
presidency, for example, by examining what intellectual trends and
constitutional developments-the early state experiments with a
fragmented executive branch and the return to a unitary executive-
gave rise to it. A more complete understanding of war powers, there-
13 This does not mean, of course, that there is full agreement on the exact nature of the ex-
ecutive power or the presidency. Consider Steven G. Calabresi and Saikrishna B. Prakash, The
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fore, requires us to examine not just the international legal thought
concerning declarations of war (as Professor Ramsey does), but more
importantly the domestic constitutional understandings, as reflected
both in intellectual trends and in the actual events preceding the rati-
fication. In contrast, Professor Ramsey's approach produces a myopic
effect, in which small differences are magnified into distinctions of
constitutional significance.
Thus, Professor Ramsey's use of the primary materials is incom-
plete because it does, not integrate his account of eighteenth-century
international legal thought into the other, most relevant primary ma-
terials involving war and the separation of powers. He has not pro-
duced any statements by actual Framers, such as Alexander Hamilton,
James Madison, or James Wilson, that rely specifically on sources like
Rutherforth, Hale, or even Vattel on the question of war powers. Sev-
eral of the authorities relied upon by Professor Ramsey were barely
mentioned in the American political literature of the 1780s, while oth-
ers-such as Montesquieu-who were the Framers' favorites go virtu-
ally unexamined. 4 Professor Ramsey never explains how the power to
declare war fit into the theories of the separation of powers advanced
by Hamilton, Madison, or Wilson. From the way Professor Ramsey
tells it, the Declare War Clause was its own independent book, with a
complete beginning, middle, and end, rather than a theme running
through the larger story of the framing.
Second, ignoring a basic rule for using history, Professor Ramsey
fails to take account of the main secondary works on the framing pe-
President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L J 541,550 (1994) (arguing that "the originalist
textual and historical arguments for the unitary Executive, taken together, firmly establish the
theory" of the unitary Executive); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L J
1725, 1750-51 (1996) (noting widespread disagreement among historians over separation-of-
powers scholarship).
14 Rutherforth, Hale, and Lee, whom Professor Ramsey credits with the idea that a decla-
ration of war was unnecessary, do not make one scholar's list of thinkers cited by the Framers. To
make that list, a writer would have had to have been cited in at least one half of one percent of
the political writing of the day. Lutz, Origins of American Constitutionalism at 142-45 (cited in
note 12). While Professor Ramsey criticizes the Grotian view of declarations of war because it
did not mirror reality and was rejected by those who followed, Grotius remained one of the most
cited thinkers on international law. See id at 142, 145. In contrast, Burlamaqui, Wolff and
Bynkershoek, upon whom Professor Ramsey places great reliance, do not appear to have been
discussed in even 0.5 percent of the Framing-era political literature.
In my earlier work on war powers, I focused most closely on Montesquieu and Blackstone.
Professor Lutz has found them to be the two most-cited secular thinkers of the Framing period.
Id at 143. While, as we all know, citation rates do not correspond exactly to influence or the im-
portance of a work, we can at least use citation works as a general proxy for the level of familiar-
ity that the Framers would have had with an author's ideas. The three European thinkers who
were the most influential on the thinking of the Framers-Montesquieu, Locke, and Black-
stone-were also the most frequently cited.
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riod. Over the last fifty years, historians have produced a rich trove of
works on the intellectual origins of the Revolution and the Constitu-
tion, including Bernard Bailyn's Ideological Origins of the American
Revolution, Gordon Wood's The Creation of the American Republic,
1776-1787, Forrest McDonald's Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellec-
tual Origins of the Constitution, and Jack Rakove's Original Mean-
ings.1 Professor Ramsey does not attempt to distill the lessons of these
secondary works, nor to place the developments that he focuses on-
the meaning of declaring war in eighteenth-century international legal
theory-within the broader intellectual, political, and constitutional
developments identified by these historians. ' As developed primarily
by Professor Wood, American constitutional thought evolved during
this period from a revolutionary belief that Americans were defending
their rights under the British constitution, to failed state experiments
in legislative supremacy during the period of initial independence, to
the Thermidorean reaction that restored power to the unitary execu-
tive.7 I will describe how the executive's war powers at first suffered,
then survived these changes in American constitutional design-in
other words, my reading of the President's war powers is consistent
15 Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Harvard 1967);
Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787 (North Carolina 1969);
Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (Kansas
1985); Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution
(Vintage Books 1996).
16 Constitutional historians have leveled this complaint against similar original understand-
ing scholarship. See, for example, Treanor, 82 Cornell L Rev at 756 (cited in note 2) ("[P]ro-
Congress scholars have been unable to offer an explanation for why the founders thought that
the power to initiate conflict should be exclusively vested in Congress"); Martin S. Flaherty, His-
tory "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 Colum L Rev 523, 525-26 (1995)
("[IHabits of poorly supported generalization [ ] pervade the work of many of the rigorous theo-
rists when they invoke the past to talk about the Constitution."). Flaherty has criticized some
original understanding work that fails to give proper attention to facts, sources, and context, and
notes that one sign of poor scholarship is a lack of "thorough reading, or at least citation, of both
primary and secondary source material generally recognized by historians as central to a given
question." Id at 553. While I have my disagreements on the historical merits with both Treanor,
see Yoo,70 U Clo L Rev at 1209-15 (cited in note 1), and Flaherty, see John C.Yoo, Treaties and
Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 Colum L Rev
2218,2221-33 (1999), we agree on the basic standards that should guide the use of history in con-
stitutional interpretation.
17 See generally Wood, Creation at 446-53 (cited in note 15). See also Marc Kruman, Be-
tween Authority & Liberty: State Constitution Making in Revolutionary America at 109-30 (North
Carolina 1997) (recounting the experiences of various colonies in balancing power between the
legislative and executive branches); Forrest McDonald, The American Presidency:An Intellectual
History 98-153 (Kansas 1995) (tracing the history of the presidency through colonial and revolu-
tionary times); Willi Paul Adams, The First American Constitutions: Republican Ideology and the
Making of the State Constitution in the Revolutionary Era 271-75 (North Carolina 1980) (Rita
and Robert Kimber, trans); Charles C. Thach Jr., The Creation of the Presidency, 1775-1789:A
Study in Constitutional History 34-35 (Johns Hopkins 1923) (examining the weaknesses of ex-
ecutives in colonial constitutions during the revolutionary period).
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with the larger story of constitutional evolution. Because he ignores
the broader historical context, Professor Ramsey cannot explain why
the Framers would swim against the currents of history by transferring
the power to initiate hostilities to the legislature when the Framers
were restoring power to the Executive branch generally.
B. The History of Early American Constitutional Development
Putting aside these methodological disagreements, Professor
Ramsey's history further falls short by failing to place his interpreta-
tion of eighteenth-century legal authorities in the context of early
American constitutional thought. Professor Ramsey has written his ar-
ticle as if the Framers had so widely and completely agreed with an ar-
ray of international legal scholars, ranging from the well-known to the
obscure, that they never felt the need to explain publicly what they
were doing. A better approach would examine not just a slice of the
intellectual debates during this time, but, more importantly, the Fram-
ers' actual experience with war matters, with constitutionalism, and
with the ratification. I have examined these developments and their
import for the war powers debate elsewhere. '8 Here, I will point out
some significant historical issues that highlight the flaws in Professor
Ramsey's account.
I have already briefly alluded to the general story of constitu-
tional development during the framing period, as outlined by the well-
known work of Professor Gordon Wood. During the eighteenth cen-
tury, the British constitutional system centralized executive power in
the Crown. Defending what they initially viewed as their constitu-
tional rights as British subjects, the American colonists believed that
the Crown's usurpation of power had produced the oppressive meas-
ures that led to the Revolution. Once independent, the founding gen-
eration experimented with direct democracy and wrote their first state
constitutions to expand the powers of their legislatures. These efforts
produced chaos, leading some states to adopt admired constitutions
that returned power to the executive branch. Following these changes,
the Framers designed a new Constitution that restored powers to a
presidency that once again enjoyed unity and independence.'9 In
evaluating Professor Wood's thesis, recent historical work has only
emphasized that the idea of a separation of powers and a stronger ex-
ecutive took hold in the American political consciousness earlier and
more deeply than thought."
18 See Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 196-294 (cited in note 1).
19 See generally Wood, Creation at 138,393-429,434 (cited in note 15).
20 See Kruman, Between Authority & Liberty at 109-30 (cited in note 17) (emphasizing the
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Several points show that war powers generally tracked this basic
account of American constitutional development. First, the British
constitution clearly granted the Crown the power to initiate war. As
the undisputed commander-in-chief of all military forces, the King
could make war at his discretion. In fact, the constitutional struggles of
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries did not involve a
question of the King's power over war, but the Parliament's control
21
over the Crown's military activities through its power of the purse.
By the time of the framing, the British political system had reached a
settlement in which Parliament's control over money gave it a func-
tional veto over whether the nation would wage war.2 Not only was
declaring war never mentioned as a significant constitutional power
for separation of powers purposes, but declarations of war were rarely
issued before or at the start of hostilities. No British subject-which is
what, after all, the Framers had been-would have associated the
power to declare war as a check on executive military action, because
Parliament already enjoyed such authority through the funding power.
During the ratifying conventions, as we will see, the Framers would
have understood the allocation of the war power between the Presi-
dent and Congress against the historical baseline established by the
struggle between the Crown and Parliament.
Second, the pre-ratification state constitutions and charters,
which Professor Ramsey does not examine, either assumed that the
executive possessed the power to begin hostilities, or vested such au-
thority explicitly in the governor. In the area of foreign affairs, the first
state constitutions generally reduced the executive not by transferring
powers directly to the legislature, but by fragmenting the unity and in-
dependence of the executive through advisory councils, multimember
executives, or limited terms.? Nonetheless, two constitutions that were
widely admired by the Framers, those of New York and Massachusetts,
bucked this trend and retained in the executive the powers of com-
mander-in-chief. These constitutions assumed that the executive con-
tinued to possess the power to make war, and, unlike South Carolina's
constitution, created no explicit requirement of consent by the legisla-
gubernatorial veto as evidence of colonial consciousness of the need for separation of powers
and a stronger executive); McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum at 80-86 (cited in note 15) (discuss-
ing the influence of Montesquieu on American ideas of separation of powers); Adams, First
American Constitutions at 256-75 (cited in note 17).
21 See Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 209-14 (cited in note 1) (discussing the struggle between Par-
liament and the King for the financial resources necessary to wage war).
22 See id. Parliament's creation and control over the financial system made possible Great
Britain's rise to power during the eighteenth century. See generally John Brewer, The Sinews of
Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783 (Knopf 1989).
23 See Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 222-23 (cited in note 1).
2002] 1649
The University of Chicago Law Review
ture for warmaking.' Massachusetts's 1780 constitution vested in the
executive the full authority "to lead and conduct [the military], and
with them to encounter, repel, resist, expel and pursue, by force of
arms, as well by sea as by land, within or without the limits of this
commonwealth" its enemies. These constitutions did not rely on the
notion that declaring war was equivalent to commencing hostilities,
and, indeed, none of them vested the legislature with the power to de-
clare war in order to check the executive. Rather, the legislature con-
tinued to possess and exercise the same check enjoyed by Parliament:
the power over funding.
Third, the leading constitutional thinkers of the day believed that
the executive ought to have the power to initiate and conduct hostili-
ties. Perhaps the three writers whom the Framers consulted most often
on the separation of powers were Locke, Montesquieu, and Black-
stone.M All three indisputably believed that the executive should exer-
cise full powers over the beginning and operation of war, subject to
the legislature's power over funding.2 Blackstone in particular de-
scribed declarations of war as only serving to notify the citizens of
both nations that the sovereign had legally sanctioned the hostilities,
rather than as a necessary constitutional step to be taken before hos-
tilities could break out. These three writers were, far and away, the
most respected authorities on the separation of powers among the
Framers. One historian, for example, calculates that Montesquieu,
Blackstone, and Locke, roughly in that order, were the most cited non-
religious thinkers in the political writing of the framing period.2
24 See id at 228-34. See SC Const Art XXVI (1776), reprinted in Francis N. Thorpe, ed, 6
The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws 3247 (GPO
1909) (mandating that an executive's power to wage war requires legislative consent). The im-
portance of the South Carolina Constitution will be addressed in the text accompanying note 87.
25 Mass Const Art VII (1780), reprinted in Francis N. Thorpe, ed, 3 The Federal and State
Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws 1901 (GPO 1909). As Gordon Wood
has observed, the Massachusetts constitution "came to stand for the reconsidered ideal of a 'per-
fect constitution' in the minds of the Framers. Wood, Creation at 434 (cited in note 15).
26 In 1770s American political writing, Montesquieu and Locke accounted for more than
75 percent of all references to Enlightenment thinkers. Lutz, Origins ofAmerican Constitutional-
ism at 142 (cited in note 12). As Lutz puts it, "Montesquieu is almost without peer during the
founding era" in terms of influence. Id at 144. After Montesquieu, Lutz reports, Blackstone was
the second most commonly cited secular thinker and was cited two-and-a-half times as often as
Locke. Id. The importance of their work on the separation of powers is discussed in W.B. Gwyn,
The Meaning of the Separation of Powers (Thlane 1965). See also M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism
and the Separation of Powers 58-130 (Liberty Fund 2d ed 1998).
27 See John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government §§ 143-47 (Barnes & Noble 3d ed
1966); Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws 194 (D. Appleton 1900) (Thomas Nugent, trans);Wil-
liam Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England *244-54 (Chicago 1979).
28 See note 26.
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To be sure, Professor Ramsey relies upon Locke and Blackstone
for his notion that declaring war meant a beginning of hostilities ei-
ther by "word or action." According to Professor Ramsey, Locke be-
lieved that "declaring war" meant commencing hostilities. The only
evidence Ramsey offers is that The Second Treatise had observed that
a state of war could be created when men "declar[ed] by Word or Ac-
tion ... a sedate setled Design, upon another Man's lfe.'' 9 He consid-
ers this single statement to be "excellent evidence of an ordinary...
usage in which 'declaring' could be done by 'word or action. '
Professor Ramsey's great reliance on this passage-indeed, it is
the crux of his argument-demonstrates the problems with his use of
primary sources. The passage from Locke does not actually use the
phrase "declaring war.' 31 Rather, it reads:
"The state of war is a state of enmity and destruction; and there-
fore declaring by word or action, not a passionate and hasty, but a
sedate, settled design upon another man's life, puts him in a state
of war with him against whom he has declared such an intention,
and so has exposed his life to the other's power to be taken away
by him, or any one that joins with him in his defence and es-
pouses his quarrel."
Locke has not used the phrase "declaring war," but has instead used
the phrase "declaring ... a sedate, settled design upon another man's
life." Here, as Professor Ramsey himself admits, Locke is generally
discussing the difference between the state of war and the state of na-
ture, and why a man's intention to commit murder places him in the
former. It is obvious that Locke is not referring to governmental struc-
ture or constitutional design, or even questions concerning relations
between nations. Since Professor Ramsey lays the foundation of his
argument on the precise meaning of "declaring war," this quote from
The Second Treatise is out of place. In fact, as far as I can tell, Locke
never used the phrase "declaring war" anywhere in the Second Trea-
tise.
Professor Ramsey focuses on this rhetorical use of "declaring"
war while ignoring The Second Treatise's more precise discussion of
war powers. For example, other passages from The Second Treatise
work out in detail the powers of the executive branch in foreign af-
29 Ramsey, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1591 (cited in note 4), quoting John Locke, The Second Trea-
tise of Government, in John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 265, § 16 at 278 (Cambridge
1988) (Peter Laslett, ed).
30 Id at 1592.
31 See Locke, Second Treatise at § 16 (cited in note 27).
32 Id (emphasis added).
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fairs. Those sections describe a "federative power," located in the ex-
ecutive branch, which contains "the power of war and peace, leagues
and alliances, and all the transactions with all persons and communi-
ties without the commonwealth." 3 Locke makes clear that the federa-
tive power is "always almost united" with the executive power, and
that separating the two would lead to "disorder and ruin" because
matters of war and peace did not lend themselves to "direct[ion] by
antecedent, standing, positive laws."4 Professor Ramsey cannot ex-
plain why Locke's rhetorical use of "declaring" war in discussing a hy-
pothetical state of nature should preempt his specific discussion of
war, foreign affairs, and the separation of powers.
Professor Ramsey repeats this odd use of primary sources in his
treatment of Blackstone. He argues that Blackstone agreed with the
idea that declaring war meant commencing war, because of a passage
from the Commentaries in which Blackstone says that a pirate, "by de-
claring war against all mankind, all mankind must declare war against
him." 35 Again, Professor Ramsey has sought to infer a precise legal
meaning of "declaring war" from what is clearly a rhetorical use of the
phrase. And again, Professor Ramsey ignores other sections in the
same source that specifically discuss war, foreign affairs, and the sepa-
ration of powers. Like Locke, Blackstone clearly believed that the
power to commence hostilities lay with the executive: "[T]he king has
also the sole prerogative of making war and peace," and the king is the
"generalissimo, or the first in military command, within the king-
dom." 3 Blackstone further argued that a declaration of war served as
more of a notification that the sovereign authority has decided on war,
and that a state of war existed between the citizens of the warring na-
tions.3' Nowhere does Blackstone assert, in the context of the separa-
tion of powers, that "declaring war" meant beginning war by "word or
action. '
33 Id at § 146.
34 Id at §§ 147-48.
35 Ramsey, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1592 (cited in note 4), quoting William Blackstone, 4 Com-
mentaries on the Laws of England *71 (Chicago 1979).
36 Blackstone, 1 Commentaries at *249,254 (cited in note 27).
37 See id at 249-50 ("[I]n order to make a war completely effectual, it is necessary with us
in England that it be publicly declared and duly proclaimed by the king's authority; and, then, all
parts of both the contending nations ... are bound by it.").
38 Professor Ramsey's decision to relegate to footnotes Blackstone's discussion of a decla-
ration of war illustrates the problems in his approach to the primary materials. See Ramsey, 69 U
Chi L Rev at 1584-85 n 167, 1588-89 n 176 (cited in note 4). With Locke and Montesquieu,
Blackstone was one of the three most influential secular thinkers among the Framers. Blackstone
in particular had great appeal to the Framers as the authoritative treatise on many areas of law.
Wood, Creation at 10 (cited in note 15). His discourses on the separation of powers and the war
power were quite familiar to the Framers; indeed, Alexander Hamilton's definition of the King's
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Finally, while he struggles to show that Vattel and Bynkershoek's
use of "declaring war" was consistent with his theory, Professor Ram-
sey pays no heed to the most influential of all writers on the separa-
tion of powers, Montesquieu.'9 In his Spirit of Laws, Montesquieu lo-
cated the foreign affairs power and, specifically, the war power in the
executive. "By the [executive power, the king] makes peace or war,
sends or receives embassies, establishes the public security, and pro-
vides against invasions." Montesquieu believed that the British legis-
lature possessed all the control it needed over the executive's war
powers, because of its authority to terminate military funding and
even to disband armies." Montesquieu clearly uses "making war" to
mean the commencement of hostilities. Montesquieu never even men-
tions "declaring war." Professor Ramsey's reliance on rhetoric by
Locke and Blackstone not only misreads those writers, but it also ig-
nores their significant agreement with Montesquieu. Properly read, all
three authorities agreed that (a) the executive possessed the power to
start hostilities, which they described as the power to "make" (not de-
clare) war, and (b) the legislature enjoyed an important check on ex-
war powers seems to derive directly from Blackstone. See Federalist 69 (Hamilton), in Clinton
Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 415-23 (Mentor 1961) (citing Blackstone for the proposition
that "the prerogative of making treaties exist[ed] in the crown in its utmost plenitude" and not-
ing that the king had the further power of "declaring war, and of raising and regulating fleets and
armies by his own authority"). Blackstone's thinking about declarations of war, we may assume,
held far more significance to the Framers than the works of Rutherforth and Hale, who were
never cited or discussed in the political literature and debates of the ratification. Blackstone had
this to say about declarations of war.
[W]hy according to the law of nations a denunciation of war ought always to precede the
actual commencement of hostilities, is not so much that the enemy may be put upon his
guard, (which is matter rather of magnanimity than right) but that it may be certainly clear
that the war is not undertaken by private persons, but by the will of the whole community;
whose right of willing is in this case transferred to the supreme magistrate by the funda-
mental laws of society. So that, in order to make a war completely effectual, it is necessary
with us in England that it be publicly declared and duly proclaimed by the king's authority;
and, then, all parts of both the contending nations, from the highest to the lowest, are bound
by it.
Blackstone, 1 Commentaries at 249-50 (cited in note 27). Somehow, Professor Ramsey reads this
language-which is clearly borrowed from Grotius-as "highly ambiguous." Ramsey, 69 U Chi L
Rev at 1584-85 n 167 (cited in note 4).To the contrary, it seems that Blackstone believed that a
declaration served the purpose of notification that hostile actions were legal because authorized
by the sovereign. In any event, Blackstone certainly does not discuss a declaration as in any way
necessary for domestic constitutional purposes.
39 Montesquieu easily outpaced all other writers in his influence on the Framers' thinking
about the separation of powers. Lutz, Origins ofAmerican Constitutionalism at 144 (cited in note
12). The writers of The Federalist Papers, for example, sometimes quoted long passages from
Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws. See, for example, Federalist 9 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed,
Federalist Papers at 74-75 (cited in note 38)
40 Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws at 182 (cited in note 27).
41 See id at 193-94.
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ecutive warmaking through its power over appropriations. We should
take such agreement seriously in interpreting the Constitution, as
Montesquieu, Locke, and Blackstone were the three most influential
authorities on the separation of powers and constitutional design of
their time. Professor Ramsey's failure to consider Montesquieu re-
veals an incomplete historical analysis, in addition to a focus on rhe-
torical language at the expense of the core historical and constitu-
tional developments of the period. 2
These three historical developments -the pattern of British prac-
tice, the experience under the state constitutions, and the work of con-
stitutional theorists-set the stage for ratification. All three sources
indicate that the Framers would have understood the President's pow-
ers as commander-in-chief and chief executive as vesting him with the
authority to initiate and conduct hostilities. They demonstrate that the
power to declare war would not have been understood by the Framers
as a significant restriction on the President's powers in war. Instead,
the relevant history points to the control over money as the legisla-
ture's most effective check on the executive branch. It is this
historical backdrop, rather than Professor Ramsey's effort to draw dis-
tinctions among eighteenth-century legal writers, that provides the
relevant context for the ratification of the Constitution.
42 Professor Ramsey's approach is even incomplete on its own terms. He seeks to develop
a rhetorical, nonlegal meaning of "declare" as used in the eighteenth century, and for that reason
turns to Locke, Blackstone, and others. Unfortunately, however, he does not adequately examine
how the Framers themselves used the word "declare" at the same level of generality and in the
same contexts in which he examined the discussions of British and international commentators. I
briefly review the Framers' use of "declare" in Part II.C, but an example here may help to high-
light the shortcomings in Ramsey's analysis. On August 17, 1787, the Federal Convention dis-
cussed Congress's power to "define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high
Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations" US Const Art I, § 8. As originally drafted, the
clause had given Congress the power to "declare the law and punishment of piracies and felo-
nies." Max Farrand, ed, 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 315 (Yale 1937) (em-
phasis added). Edmund Randolph "doubted only the efficacy of the word 'declare," id, and he
and James Madison moved to replace it with "define." Id at 316. It appears that Madison be-
lieved that the power to declare existing felonies at common law would be difficult because such
crimes were "vague" and subject to competing interpretations by the states. See id.rThe Conven-
tion adopted Madison and Randolph's amendment unanimously. See id. Thus, the delegates
apparently thought the power to "declare" the law and punishment of piracy and offenses
against the law of nations was limited only to expressing the existing state of the law, so much so
that they vested in Congress the broader power to "define" such crimes. This discussion is
especially revealing because it occurred on the same day as the Convention's quick decision to
change Congress's power from "make" to "declare" war. Id at 318-19. What is troubling about
Professor Ramsey's analysis is that he never undertakes the same review of the most directly
relevant source-the Framers' use of the word "declare"-that he attempts to provide with the
British and international sources. As a result, Professor Ramsey's approach bears the strange
feature of privileging the word choice of foreign writers above the thinking of the Framers them-
selves.
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C. Understanding the Original Understanding
These discrete flaws are symptomatic of Textualism and War
Powers's deeper problem: It lacks a consistent approach to interpreta-
tion. Professor Ramsey does not identify what aspects of the original
understanding are important, what moments in the revolutionary or
ratification periods are critical, or what types of evidence are more
relevant than others. A more nuanced view of originalism recognizes
that the understandings of the state ratifying conventions are of pri-
mary importance, because it was their approval that brought the Con-
stitution into force as a legal and political matter.4 3 The intellectual his-
tory of the period is important only insofar as it helps us recreate what
the Constitution's ratifiers thought the text that they ratified meant.
Even though certain ideas, definitions, and concepts might have been
present in the intellectual world of the eighteenth century, they are
not relevant to the original understanding unless they were known to,
and understood by, the Framers who ratified the Constitution.
One of Professor Ramsey's difficulties is that he cannot draw
connections between his evidence-the rhetorical usage of the phrase
"declaring war" in some eighteenth-century sources-with the actual
43 See Rakove, Original Meanings at 9 (cited in note 15) ("[T]he authority of the Constitu-
tion as supreme law rests on its ratification by the special, popularly elected conventions of
1787-88."); Leonard Levy, Original Intent and the Framers' Constitution 1-29 (Macmillan 1988)
(examining and interpreting the arguments made during the ratifying conventions); Charles A.
Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 Const Commentary 77,111-13 (1988)
("[lit is not too much to say that at least some of the founders saw the ratifiers' historical or sub-
jective intent as a check on constructions which cut loose from the original understandings of the
sovereign people.").
This view of the primacy of the state ratification conventions was shared by several of the
leading Framers. As James Madison argued during the 1794 Jay Treaty debates, when the draft
Constitution "came from [the Philadelphia convention] it was nothing more than the draft of a
plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity were breathed into it by the voice of the
people, speaking through the several State Conventions." 5 Annals of Congress 776 (Gales and
Seaton 1849). On this point, Madison was repeating the view he had expressed as Publius during
the ratification struggle itselL See Federalist 40 (Madison), in Rossiter, ed, Federalist Papers at
252 (cited in note 38) (arguing that the Constitution was "of no more consequence that the paper
on which it is written, unless it be stamped with the approbation of those to whom it is ad-
dressed."). James Wilson made the same argument about the primacy of the ratifying conven-
tions over the constitutional convention as well. See Merrill Jensen, ed, 2 Documentary History
of the Ratification of the Constitution 483-84 (State Historical Society of Wisconsin 1976) (state-
ment in Pennsylvania ratifying convention).
Professor Ramsey does not appear to place any great weight in the Philadelphia Conven-
tion's decision to change Congress's power from "make war" to "declare war." Farrand, ed, 2 Re-
cords 318-19 (cited in note 42). I agree with Professor Ramsey here, not only because Madison's
brief (and secret) notes of this decision seem garbled, but also because the Federal Convention
itself exercised no power other than that of making recommendations. As the Framers them-
selves understood, it was the ratifying conventions that gave the Constitution its political legiti-
macy, not the proceedings of the Philadelphia convention. See, for example, Yoo, 99 Colum L
Rev at 2025-26 n 328 (cited in note 16).
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events of the ratification. Nevertheless, he claims that the Framers
transformed a certain understanding of a nation's power to declare
war under international law-one that he admits is not all that clear
and distinct from the one I have identified in earlier work-into an
element of the separation of powers. Professor Ramsey does not un-
dertake the difficult project of explaining how a power relevant for
purposes of international law metamorphosed into a critical check by
which Congress could control the war powers of the President. Nor
does Professor Ramsey examine the development of the separation of
powers and of the foreign affairs power during the ratification, which
ought to occupy the core of any account of the original understanding
of the war power.
As a result, Professor Ramsey's account of the ratification is dis-
appointing. He seems unaware of the course of ratification in the dif-
ferent state conventions, of the central disputes that arose between
Federalists and Anti-Federalists, and of the political forces at work in
the states or in the nation as a whole. In only a cursory review, Profes-
sor Ramsey examines the few mentions of declarations of war during
the ratification to show the Framers' use of the phrase does not clearly
foreclose his thesis.4 He has not shown, however, that any of these ex-
amples demonstrate that the Framers understood "declaring war" to
mean specifically commencing or engaging in hostilities, as no Framer
apparently ever described the power in that fashion. All Professor
Ramsey is left with are a few Federalist claims that the new President
would not be a despot, because the Constitution transferred to Con-
gress several of the king's powers, such as that of declaring war and of
raising armies.4 In none of these exchanges did the Federalists explain
what "declaring war" meant; they only included it in a general enu-
meration of Congress's powers.
By contrast, there was an important moment in the ratifying con-
vention when the precise issue-whether Congress could prevent a
President from unilateral warmaking-was joined. It was not raised in
an obscure, garbled, last-minute debate (as was the drafting of the De-
clare War Clause during the Philadelphia Convention), or an unread
Anti-Federalist paper. Rather, the question was directly raised and an-
44 See Ramsey, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1602-06 (cited in note 4).
45 See generally Federalist 69 (Hamilton) at 415-23 (cited in note 38) (indicating that the
President is significantly less powerful than the King of Great Britain and that Congress is
granted power over declaring war and raising armies); Jonathan Elliot, ed, 4 The Debates in the
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 107 (2d ed 1836) (speech
of James Iredell before the North Carolina ratifying convention) ("The President has not the
power of declaring war by his own authority, nor that of raising fleets and armies. These powers
are vested in other hands.").
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swered in the ratifying convention of the most important state in the
Union. Virginia was the critical state for ratification.4 Virginia also
recommends itself because, from the records that survive, it appears
that the state experienced the fullest, and most contested, debate over
the Constitution. Anti-Federalists brought forth their greatest leaders,
such as Patrick Henry, George Mason, and Edmund Randolph, to do
battle with Federalist leaders such as George Washington, James
Madison, and John Marshall." Virginia was also the toughest hurdle
that the Constitution surmounted on the way to ratification; an Anti-
Federalist motion to send the Constitution back for amendment lost
by only 88 to 80.s Virginia, therefore, should be of decisive importance
in interpreting the Constitution because it was a critical "vetogate"
through which the Constitution had to pass before becoming law.9
In this most critical of ratification conventions, Anti-Federalists
waged a direct attack on the Constitution's allocation of war powers.
Anti-Federalists claimed that the states would have no means to con-
trol the national government's ability to make war, and they further
argued that the Constitution would not prevent the President from
becoming a military despot. 0 Patrick Henry argued before the Virginia
convention:
If your American chief, be a man of ambition, and abilities, how
easy is it for him to render himself absolute! The army is in his
hands, and, if he be a man of address, it will be attached to him;
and it will be the subject of long meditation with him to seize the
46 Geographically, Virginia linked the North and South, and its political importance was
such that leading Federalists believed that the Constitution would never survive without her ap-
proval. See Bernard Bailyn, ed, 2 Debate on the Constitution 1067 (Library of America 1993)
("[B]oth Federalists and Antifederalists anticipate that a union without Virginia and New York
will be impracticable."); Forrest McDonald, We the People: The Economic Origins of the Consti-
tution 255-56 (Chicago 1958) (noting the importance of Virginia to ratification). Although when
the Virginia Convention began only eight states had ratified the Constitution, by the time it rati-
fied the Constitution it was the tenth state to do so. Nonetheless, both contemporaneous observ-
ers and modern-day historians agree that the Union could not have survived without Virginia's
agreement to the Constitution. See id.
47 See Lance Banning, Virginia: Sectionalism and the General Good, in Michael A. Gillespie
and Michael Lienesch, eds, Ratifying the Constitution 261-99 (Kansas 1989) (describing circum-
stances of Virginia ratifying convention).
4 John P. Kaminski and Gaspare J. Saladino, eds, 10 The Documentary History of the Rati-
fication of the Constitution 1538 (State Historical Society of Wisconsin 1993) (vote of June 25,
1788).
49 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey, and Elizabeth Garrett, Cases and Materials
on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy 66-67 (West 3d ed 2001) (defining and
discussing vetogates).
50 Under the Articles of Confederation, the states controlled the sources of supply and
money for the national government, which allowed the states to prevent any actions with which
they disagreed. See generally Federalist 11-13 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed, Federalist Papers at
84-99 (cited in note 38).
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first auspicious moment to accomplish his design .... If we make
a King, we may prescribe the rules by which he shall rule his
people, and interpose such checks as shall prevent him from in-
fringing them: But the President, in the field, at the head of his
army, can prescribe the terms on which he shall reign master, so
far that it will puzzle any American ever to get his neck from un-
der the galling yoke.... If ever he violates the laws ... [h]e [may]
come at the head of his army to carry every thing before him ....
[W]here is the existing force to punish him? Can he not at the
head of his army beat down every opposition? Away with your
President, we shall have a King: The army will salute him Mon-
arch; your militia will leave you and assist in making him King,
and fight against you: And what have you to oppose this force?
What will then become of you and your rights? Will not absolute
despotism ensue?"
To eliminate the specter of executive tyranny, Anti-Federalists
wanted to restore the funding power to the states, ban standing armies
in peacetime, and return control over the militias to the states.R In
other words, it was not enough that the purse and sword would be in
separate hands-Anti-Federalists wanted the purse and sword to be in
different governments.
In response, Federalists never described Congress's power to de-
clare war as a check on the President, even though it was very much in
their interest to do so. Rather, they relied upon the traditional legisla-
tive check on executive warmaking established by Congress's control
over fundin. This created a double security against tyranny. First, the
federal government's power to make war itself would be divided, and,
second, Congress would have a powerful means of controlling presi-
dential military adventurism. Replied Federalist George Nicholas:
Under the new Government, no appropriation of money, to the
use of raising or supporting an army, shall be for a longer term
than two years. The President is to command. But the regulation
of the army and navy is given to Congress. Our representatives
will be a powerful check here. The influence of the Commons in
England in this case is very predominant. 3
In other words, the warmaking relationship between President
and Congress would operate just as did the one between Crown and
51 John P. Kaminski and Gaspare J. Saladino, eds, 9 Documentary History of the Ratification
of the Constitution 964 (State Historical Society of Wisconsin 1990) (speech of June 5,1788).
52 See Kaminski and Saladino, eds, 10 Documentary History at 1554 (cited in note 48)
(proposed amendments reported out June 27,1788).
53 Id at 1281 (speech of June 14,1788).
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Parliament. It is significant that Anti-Federalists did not disagree
about the workings of the British system. They appear only to have
believed that the conspiring branches of the federal government
would combine these powers to oppress the states.
Madison, as the leader of the drive for ratification in Virginia, fol-
lowed with a powerful rejection of the Anti-Federalist critique. Madi-
son criticized Henry's view that the purse and sword had to be held by
different governments (in other words, the states and the national).
He explicitly analogized to the British experience:
What is the meaning of this maxim? Does it mean that the sword
and purse ought not to be trusted in the hands of the same Gov-
ernment? This cannot be the meaning. For there never was, and I
can say there never will be, an efficient Government, in which
both are not vested. The only rational meaning, is, that the sword
and purse are not to be given to the same member. Apply it to
the British Government, which has been mentioned. The sword is
in the hands of the British King. The purse in the hands of the
Parliament. It is so in America, as far as any analogy can exist.m
Like Nicholas, Madison never invoked Congress's power to de-
clare war as a legislative check on the executive. Rather, in order to
deflect accusations that the executive branch would remain uncon-
trolled, he relied directly upon Congress's control over funding. He
even predicted that Congress's powers over warmaking would operate
in a manner identical to those of Parliament.
Madison further emphasized that the funding power, in addition
to Congress's other powers over the military, would prove to be more
than enough of a check on the President.
The purse is in the hands of the Representatives of the people.
They have the appropriation of all monies. They have the direc-
tion and regulation of land and naval forces. They are to provide
for calling forth the militia-And the President is to have the
command; and, in conjunction with the Senate, to appoint the of-
ficers.s
It is important to notice what Madison did not argue. Madison
did not assert that the Declare War Clause would check presidential
power. Nor did he claim that the Constitution imposed specific and
formal rules for the warmaking process, as it did for the legislative
process. Instead, Madison argued that the branches would develop
their war policies through the conflict or cooperation of their plenary
54 Id at 1282 (speech of June 14,1788).
55 Id.
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constitutional powers. He emphasized Congress's power over funding
and over the military, not the power to declare war.
Together, Federalists and Anti-Federalists in Virginia engaged in
a debate over the war power, and the understanding that emerged fol-
lowed traditional Anglo-American practice. As commander-in-chiet
the President would have the initiative in matters of war, but Congress
could use its appropriations power to enforce its own policies. No-
where in this critical debate, which represents the most direct ex-
change of views over war powers between Federalists and Anti-
Federalists, does the power to declare war make an appearance. As
Virginia was the critical state in the process of ratification, this evi-
dence directly reflects the original understanding of war powers held
by those who ratified the Constitution. These exchanges serve as the
most authoritative historical source for interpreting the war power,
because they record the public explanation of the Constitution's
meaning that won its ratification.
Professor Ramsey never explains, nor even takes note of, the Vir-
ginia ratifying convention. This shows the core fault in his methodol-
ogy. To be sure, he has identified some examples in which some eight-
eenth-century writers appeared to use the phrase "declare war" to
mean commence war. Professor Ramsey's effort, however, to prove
that the Framers' understanding of the phrase was not inconsistent
with these rhetorical uses of "declare war" does not present a coher-
ent historical account of the development of the war power. Unfortu-
nately, Professor Ramsey's approach ignores the richness of the his-
torical context and the importance of the political decisions and ex-
planations made by the Framers themselves. A more comprehensive
theory, which I have undertaken earlier and have only summarized
here, shows that the Framers did not believe they had established a
strict, legalistic process for warmaking. Instead, they expected that the
branches would use their plenary constitutional powers to either co-
operate or contest for primacy over war.
II. FIGHTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT
That said, I agree with the central tenet of Textualism and War
Powers that we should interpret the Constitution based on the mean-
ing of its words as understood by its ratifiers. Professor Ramsey says
that this methodology "gives much more primacy to the actual words
of the Constitution, and accords much less importance to extrapola-
tions from statements (particularly after-the-fact statements) of the
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generalized outlook of individual Framers.' 'n Unfortunately, I am
afraid that Professor Ramsey has failed to satisfy his own standards.
He has not given his attention to the Constitution's actual text and
structure, and instead he has sought to "extrapolate," from a few quo-
tations, a shared original understanding. Yet, his historical account
conceals a simple textual argument long made by pro-Congress schol-
ars. He believes that the power to declare war must mean something
more than what its text suggests, and that something must be the sole
authority to commence hostilities.
In this and the following Part, I explain why the text and struc-
ture of the Constitution cannot support this reading. First, I should
make clear the core of Professor Ramsey's textual argument and its
implications. As I understand it, Professor Ramsey believes that the
Constitution sets out a single process for waging war. As others have
argued before, Professor Ramsey believes that the Framers under-
stood the Declare War Clause as giving Congress the sole power to
decide on whether to commence military hostilities against other na-
tions. Under international and domestic law at the time, therefore,
"declare war" meant "begin war" or "commence war" or "authorize
war." Only once Congress had issued this authorization could the
President trigger his commander-in-chief authority and fight the war
to its conclusion.
Professor Ramsey's position simply finds little support in the con-
stitutional text and structure. Professor Ramsey's textual problems are
threefold. First, he defines the President's commander-in-chief and
executive powers only as the residue of the Declare War Clause,
rather than as independent grants of authority. Upon closer examina-
tion, however, it seems clear that these authorities provide the Presi-
dent with the initiative and leadership in war, including the power to
commence hostilities. Second, Professor Ramsey ignores important
provisions in the Constitution itself; and in other founding documents,
that demonstrate that the Declare War Clause does not include the
exclusive power to initiate hostilities. These provisions, such as Article
I, Section 10 of the Constitution, which bars states from "engag[ing] in
War" without congressional consent, show that when the Framers
wanted to require legislative pre-approval of hostilities, they knew
how to do it!" Third, the pro-Congress view of war powers runs
counter to the deeper structure of the Constitution and the nature of
56 Ramsey, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1554 (cited in note 4).
57 Ramsey and I agree, as do most commentators on the subject, that if the United States
suffers an attack, no declaration of war is necessary.
58 US Const Art I, § 10.
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the executive power. This Part will take up the job of analyzing the
textual and structural basis for the allocation of war powers.
A. Practice and the Commander-in-Chief
Professor Ramsey's textual argument is a relatively simple one.
Because declarations of war do not matter much, the power to declare
war must be broader than its terms suggest. In fact, it must include the
sole power to commence military hostilities because otherwise it
would be meaningless. Professor Ramsey mistakenly believes that a
textualist approach allows the Declare War Clause to be read in isola-
tion. One of the most serious shortcomings of Textualism and War
Powers is its failure to address other constitutional provisions that di-
rectly involve the making of war. Instead of turning immediately to
eighteenth-century legal commentary, a textualist interpreter of war
powers ought first to consider the import of the vesting of all execu-
tive power in the President, the Commander-in-Chief Clause, Article I,
Section 10's prohibition on state warmaking, Article III's definition of
treason, and Congress's powers over the raising and supporting of ar-
mies. Placing the Declare War Clause in its textual context shows that
the Constitution does not define a legalistic procedure for warmaking,
but instead creates a flexible system that permits different variations
to be created through the interaction of the political branches.
While Congress has the power to declare war, the President also
possesses significant war powers, ones that Professor Ramsey does not
address with the same attention that he brings to the Declare War
Clause. Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the "Presi-
dent shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into
the actual Service of the United States."'9 He is further vested with all
of "the executive Power" and the duty to execute the laws.60 These
provisions have long been recognized to give the President absolute
command over the armed forces of the United States, to the point of
ordering their use in hostilities abroad. Nowhere does the constitu-
tional text provide that the commander-in-chief power cannot be used
by the President to wage military hostilities unless Congress first is-
sues a declaration of war. Professor Ramsey never examines the origi-
nal meaning of the Commander-in-Chief Clause, but rather merely as-
sumes that the Declare War Clause must somehow trump the Com-
mander-in-Chief Clause, and then devotes some afterthought to defin-
59 US Const Art II, § 2, cl 1.
60 US Const Art II, § 1, cl 1; US Const Art II, § 3.
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ing the scope of the executive's power by the afterglow of the Declare
War Clause.
Professor Ramsey's neglect of the President's textual powers un-
der Article II amounts to a fatal flaw. As practice shows, many have in-
terpreted these provisions to allow the President to deploy military
forces and to use them both to protect the national security and to ad-
vance American foreign policy interests. The historical record shows
that Congress has declared war only five times, the most recent one
more than fifty years ago in World War 11.61 Meanwhile, presidents
have committed military forces to combat without a declaration of
war at least 125 times in the Constitution's 210-year history.62 Since
World War II, moreover, presidents have engaged in several signifi-
cant military engagements without a declaration of war or other con-
gressional authorization. When President Truman introduced Ameri-
can troops into Korea in 1950, he did not seek congressional authori-
zation, relying instead on his inherent executive and commander-in-
chief powers.6 In the Vietnam conflict, President Johnson never ob-
tained a declaration of war nor an unambiguous congressional au-
thorization, although the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution expressed some
level of congressional support for military intervention."' Congress,
61 The other four were the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War of 1848, the Spanish-
American War of 1898, and World War I.
62 See Congressional Research Service, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces
Abroad, 1798-1989, reprinted in Thomas M. Franck and Michael J. Glennon, Foreign Relations
and National Security Law 650 (West 2d ed 1993) (listing 215 instances in which the United
States has used military forces abroad and noting that, in many of those instances, the actions
were conducted "solely under the President's powers as Chief Executive or Commander in
Chief"); Office of the Legal Adviser, United States Department of State, The Legality of United
States Participation in the Defense of Vietnam (March 4,1966), in Richard A. Falk, ed, 1 The Viet-
nam War and International Law 583,597 (Princeton 1968) (noting that there have been at least
125 instances in which the President has activated the armed forces without congressional au-
thorization). Critics argue, however, that most of these interventions either were small-scale op-
erations or received some form of congressional approval.
63 See Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 178-79 (cited in note 1).
64 While presidential critics such as Ely and Henkin generally attack unilateral executive
warmaking in the postwar period, they find the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution to amount to accept-
able congressional authorization for war, even though it was not a declaration of war. See Ely,
War and Responsibility at 16 (cited in note 2) (claiming that the Resolution "certainly was broad
enough to authorize the subsequent actions President Johnson took in Vietnam"); Henkin, Con-
stitutionalism at 84 (cited in note 2) ("In my view, Congress had in fact authorized [the Vietnam
War] in the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and the war was therefore within the President's authority
delegated to him by Congress"). Other critics, however, believe the Vietnam War was unconsti-
tutional as well. See, for example, J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 Duke L J 27,70-71 (1991)
(arguing that Congress shirked its responsibilities by failing to obey constitutional formalities
with regard to the Vietnam conflict); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency 180
(Houghton Mifflin 1989) (stating that a resolution, such as the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, "giving
the President authority to use force as he saw fit in vague future contingencies was precisely the
sort of resolution rejected as unacceptable in the early republic"); Francis D. Wormuth, The
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however, never authorized the expansion of the Vietnam War into
Laos and Cambodia by President Nixon.6'
To be sure, in the wake of Vietnam, Congress enacted the War
Powers Resolution, which places time limits and reporting require-
ments on the use of American military force abroad.66 Presidents,
however, have refused to acknowledge its legality, and neither Con-
gress nor the courts have shown any interest in enforcing it. Presidents
Ford, Carter, and Reagan, for example, engaged in several military ac-
tions without congressional assent, although they did submit reports
that were consistent (while disclaiming compliance) with the require-
ments of the Resolution. 6' Publicly declaring that he had the constitu-
tional authority to initiate war unilaterally, President Bush committed
a half-million soldiers to warfare in Operation Desert Storm for a pe-
riod of time that violated the War Powers Resolution.8 President Clin-
ton followed these precedents with interventions in Somalia, Haiti,
Bosnia, the Middle East, and, most significantly, Kosovo, none of
which were authorized by Congress.6
Practice plays an important interpretive role for the question of
the proper allocation of war powers. Both the Supreme Court and the
political branches have often recognized that governmental practice
represents a significant factor in establishing the contours of the con-
stitutional separation of powers.0 Further, the role of practice in un-
derstanding the constitutional text is heightened in the foreign affairs
and national security areas, where an absence of judicial precedent re-
quires us to examine for authority the long history of interbranch in-
Nixon Theory of the War Power:A Critique, 60 Cal L Rev 623,690-94 (1972) ("[S]ince the Tonkin
Gulf Resolution did not elect either general or limited war and did not authorize the President
to define our legal status, we were in a position that had no legal characterization, except, of
course, illegality.").
65 See generally John Hart Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part 11: The Unconstitu-
tionality of the War They Didn't Tell Us About, 42 Stan L Rev 1093 (1990).
66 War Powers Resolution, Pub L No 93-148, 87 Stat 555 (1973), codified at 50 USC §§
1541-48 (1994).
67 Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 181-82 (cited in note 1).
68 See id at 186-88 (describing the interaction of the President with Congress and the
courts during the Gulf crisis).
69 See Yoo, 148 U Pa L Rev at 1678-83 (cited in note 1) (describing the lack of congres-
sional authorization for the use of American troops in Kosovo).
70 See, for example, Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361,393 (1989) (recognizing the sig-
nificance of understanding practical consequences when determining the placement of commis-
sions within the federal government); Youngstown Sheet & Tube v Sawyer, 343 US 579, 637
(1952) (Jackson concurring) ("[C]ongressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may some-
times, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential
responsibility."); United States v Midwest Oil Co, 236 US 459, 474 (1915) (noting that a "long-
continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress" creates a presumption that the
practice is legitimate).
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terpretation and interaction.7 Finally, practice shows that many gov-
ernment leaders throughout American history have read the constitu-
tional text as providing presidents with the power to commence mili-
tary hostilities without congressional authorization.
Practice demonstrates that the political branches have read the
constitutional text to establish a stable, working system of war powers.
The President has taken the primary role in deciding when and how to
initiate hostilities. Congress has allowed the executive branch to as-
sume the leadership and initiative in war, and instead has assumed the
role of approving military actions after the fact by declarations of
support and by appropriations. As I will describe below, this practical
reading of the text is consistent with the original understanding of the
commander-in-chief and executive powers held during the period
leading up to the Constitution's ratification." Throughout American
history, courts have agreed that these powers give the President broad
constitutional authority to use military force in response to threats to
the national security and foreign policy of the United States.7
In light of Article II's text, I have argued that the Constitution
constructs a loose framework within which the President as com-
mander-in-chief enjoys substantial discretion and initiative in conduct-
ing military hostilities. At the same time, Congress plays a significant
role by controlling both the resources for war (through funding) and
the legal status of hostilities (through declaring war). Unlike the legis-
lative process, the constitutional text here clearly does not establish a
71 See Robert J. Delahunty and John C. Yoo, The President's Constitutional Authority to
Conduct Military Operations against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations that Harbor or Sup-
port Them, 25 Harv J L & Pub Pol 487,503 (2002).
72 See Koh, National Security Constitution at 123-33 (cited in note 2) (describing and criti-
cizing Congress's role during recent military interventions).
73 See Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 196-241 (cited in note 1) (describing the attitudes in Britain
and the colonies towards the allocation of war powers).
74 See Loving v United States, 517 US 748,776 (1996) (Scalia concurring in part and con-
curring in judgment) (stating that the "inherent powers" of the commander-in-chief "are clearly
extensive"); Johnson v Eisentrager, 339 US 763, 789 (1950) (noting that it is not the role of the
judiciary to entertain suits that challenge the President's authority to deploy United States
armed forces "abroad or to any particular region"); The Prize Cases, 67 US (2 Black) 635, 670
(1862) (whether the President "in fulfilling his duties as Commander in Chief' had met with a
situation justifying treating the southern States as belligerents and instituting a blockade, was a
question "to be decided by him" and which the Court could not question, but must leave "to the
political department of the Government to which this power was entrusted"); Fleming v Page, 50
US (9 How) 603,614 (1850) ("As commander-in-chief; [the President] is authorized to direct the
movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to employ them
in the manner he may deem most effectual."); Massachusetts v Laird, 451 F2d 26, 32 (1st Cir
1971) (noting that the President has "power as Commander-in-Chief to station forces abroad").
See also William P. Barr, Authority to Use United States Military Forces in Somalia, in 16 Op Off
Legal Counsel 6 (1992) (noting the President has the authority to commit troops to "protect So-
malians and other foreign nationals in Somalia").
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specific procedure for going to war. Rather, it allocates different, po-
tentially conflicting war powers to the two branches. Professor Ram-
sey cannot demonstrate that the constitutional text compels the sort
of smooth, legalistic process upon the exercise of the commander-in-
chief and executive powers that he proposes. Indeed, when heeding
the better angels of his nature, Ramsey has recognized that Article II's
unenumerated grant of powers requires that foreign affairs powers
generally be understood as vested in the President, and that any am-
biguities in the allocation of powers involving international relations
must be construed in favor of the executive branch.75
B. Declaring War and Congressional Consent
Professor Ramsey presumably does not grapple with the execu-
tive's textual war powers because he assumes that the meaning of the
Declare War Clause is utterly clear. Professor Ramsey has reached
this conclusion, however, without examining the text of Declare War
Clause itself. The Constitution nowhere defines or uses the phrase
"declare" in the manner suggested by Professor Ramsey. If he were
correct, we should expect the Framers to have repeated the phrase
elsewhere in the Constitution when addressing the same subject. The
Framers, however, chose otherwise.
When discussing war in other contexts, the Constitution employs
phrases that indicate that declaring war referred to something less
than the sole power to send the nation into hostilities. In Article I, Sec-
tion 10, for example, the Constitution declares that states may not
"engage" in war.76 Granting Congress the sole authority to "engage"
the nation in war would have been a much clearer, direct method for
vesting in Congress the power to control the actual conduct of war. To
take another example, Article III of the Constitution defines the crime
of treason, in part, as consisting of "levying War" against the United
States.7 Again, "levying" appears to be broader in meaning than
merely declaring. If the Framers had used "levy War" in Article I, Sec-
tion 8, they certainly would have made far clearer their alleged inten-
tion to grant Congress the sole power to decide whether to send the
United States to war against another country.
Article I, Section 10 deals the most direct blow to Professor Ram-
sey's textualist reading. It states:
75 See Saikrishna B. Prakash and Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign
Affairs, 111 Yale L J 231,252-53 (2001) ("[T]he starting point is that foreign affairs powers are
presidential ... from the ordinary eighteenth-century meaning of executive power.").
76 USConstArtl,§10,c13.
77 US Const Art III,§ 3, cl 1.
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No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of
Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter
into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a
foreign power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in
such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.9
This provision creates exactly the war powers process, between Con-
gress and the States, that Professor Ramsey wants to create between
Congress and the President. It even includes an exception for defend-
ing against sudden attacks, which Professor Ramsey and others have
read into the Declare War Clause to make their theory workable. Pro-
fessor Ramsey does not even attempt to account for the difference in
language between Article I, Section 8 and Article I, Section 10.
If textualists assume that specific texts have specific meanings,
they also must believe that different texts should be interpreted to
have different meanings. If the pro-Congress reading were correct, the
Framers naturally would have written a provision stating that "the
President may not, without the Consent of Congress, engage in War,
unless the United States are actually invaded, or in such imminent
Danger as will not admit of delay." Or, Article I, Section 10 should
have said "No state shall, without the consent of Congress, declare
war." Instead, the Constitution only allocates to Congress the declare-
war power and to the President the commander-in-chief power, with-
out specifically stating-as it does in Article I, Section 10 with regard
to the states-how those powers are to interact. The Constitution's
creation of a specific, detailed war powers process at the state level,
but its silence at the federal level, demonstrates that the Constitution
does not establish any specific procedure for going to war.79
Two additional textual clues support an understanding of "de-
clare war" as a means of recognizing the legal status of hostile acts,
rather than as a necessary authorization for hostilities. Congress's
power to declare war does not stand alone, but instead is part of a
clause that includes the power to "grant Letters of Marque and Repri-
78 US Const Art I, § 10, cl 3 (emphasis added).
79 Article I, Section 10 prohibits the states from making any "agreement or compact" with
a foreign power. US Coast Art I, § 10, cl 3. In arguing that the President has the authority to
make sole executive agreements, Professor Ramsey has claimed that this bar on the states im-
plies that the Constitution recognizes certain forms of non-treaty international agreements that
are not prohibited to the federal government. See Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and
the (Non) Treaty Power, 77 NC L Rev 133,162-63 (1998). In reaching this conclusion, Professor
Ramsey agrees with Myres S. McDougal and Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive
or PresidentialAgreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy: I, 54 Yale L J 181,205
(1945) (describing agreements that relied upon the President's independent powers). It is puz-
zling that Professor Ramsey would rely on Article I, Section 10 in earlier work and yet ignore it
here.
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sal" and to "make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water."'
Placement of the power to declare war alongside these other two is
significant, because they clearly involved the power of Congress to
recognize or declare the legal status and consequences of certain war-
time actions, and not the power to authorize those actions. Letters of
marque and reprisal allowed a sovereign nation to extend the protec-
tions of the laws of war to private forces acting in coordination with its
armed forces."' Rules concerning captures determine the law that ap-
plies to prizes seized by American forces. In both cases, these powers
did not act to authorize hostilities as much as they determined the le-
gal status and consequences of those hostilities. Understood in this
way, adding the power to declare war to these other two in Article I,
Section 8 makes perfect sense.
Second, other foundational documents of the period demonstrate
that the Framers thought of the power to begin hostilities as different
from the power to declare war. Under the Articles of Confederation,
the nation's framework of government until the ratification, Congress
operated as the executive branch of the United States." Article IX
vested Congress with "the sole and exclusive right and power of de-
termining on peace and war."" Here the Framers (several of whom
had served in the Continental Congress) ' had on hand a text that
clearly and explicitly allocated to Congress the "sole and exclusive"
authority to decide ("determining on") whether to fight a war. If the
Framers had intended to grant Congress the power to commence mili-
tary hostilities, they could easily have imported the phrase from the
Articles of Confederation into the Constitution, as they did with the
powers adjacent to the Declare War Clause.Y For Professor Ramsey to
80 USConstArtI,§8,clll.
81 See Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 250-52 (cited in note 1). See also C. Kevin Marshall, Comment,
Putting Privateers in Their Place: The Applicability of the Marque and Reprisal Clause to Unde-
clared Wars, 64 U Chi L Rev 953,974-81 (1997) (describing use of letters of marque and reprisal
during the Revolutionary War).
82 See Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 236 (cited in note 1); Jerrilyn Greene Marston, King and Con-
gress: The Transfer of Political Legitimacy, 1774-1776 303 (Princeton 1987) (arguing that "the ex-
ecutive and administrative responsibilities that had been exercised by or under the aegis of the
king's authority were confided to the successor to his authority, the Congress").
83 Articles of Confederation Art IX (1777).
84 James Madison, for example, had represented Virginia in the Congress, and his frustra-
tions with the Articles of Confederation had led to his efforts to form a new Constitution.
85 Article IX also gave Congress the power to "establishol rules for deciding, in all cases,
what captures on land or water shall be legal," and "of granting letters of marque and reprisal in
times of peace." Articles of Confederation Art IX. Both provisions remained substantially un-
changed in the Constitution, and, in fact, they appear in the same clause as the power to declare
war. The Framers' alteration of Congress's authority from determining on peace and war to de-
claring war, while leaving the other provisions unchanged, indicates an intention to alter Con-
gress's war power.
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be right, the Framers would have had to be clumsy draftsmen indeed,
for they would have deliberately chosen more ambiguous, less defined
words to achieve their meaning when clear examples lay readily at
hand.
As a matter of methodology, it makes no sense to ignore a docu-
ment as historically and legally significant as the Articles of Confed-
eration. Professor Ramsey further fails to take into account the next
most important documents: the state constitutions. Most of the state
constitutions did not explicitly transfer to their assemblies the power
to initiate hostilities, but rather sought to control executive power by
disrupting the structural unity of the executive branch." One state,
however, chose to create exactly the type of arrangement contem-
plated by Professor Ramsey and other pro-Congress scholars. In its
first 1776 constitution, South Carolina vested in its chief executive the
power of commander-in-chief, but then declared that "the president
and commander-in-chief shall have no power to make war or peace ...
without the consent of the general assembly and legislative council.
' 'n
In its 1778 constitution, South Carolina reaffirmed its decision that the
legislature first must authorize war by stating that "the governor and
commander-in-chief shall have no power to commence war, or con-
clude peace" without legislative approval. South Carolina's 1776 and
1778 constitutions bear two important lessons. First, they show that
the Framers did not understand the phrase "declare war" to amount to
the power to "make war" or "commence war"-phrases the South
Carolina constitution used to refer specifically to initiating war. Sec-
ond, the South Carolina constitutions provide an example of constitu-
tional language that clearly and explicitly created the very legislature-
dominated warmaking system that Professor Ramsey and the pro-
Congress camp favor. Yet, those scholars would have us believe that
the Framers consciously established a specific system of legislative au-
thorization by using far more ambiguous, unclear language in the fed-
eral Constitution.
C. The Meaning of Declare
"Declare" carried a distinct and separate meaning from "levy,"
"engage," "make," or "commence." As even Professor Ramsey would
agree, his work focuses on the meaning of "declaring war" as used by
legal scholars in the period preceding the ratification. He fails, how-
86 See Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 222-23 (cited in note 1); Adams, First American Constitutions
at 271 (cited in note 17).
87 SC Const Art XXVI (1776), reprinted in Thorpe, ed, 6 The Federal and State Constitu-
tions at 3247 (cited in note 24).
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ever, to examine how members of the framing generation would have
understood those words. As an initial matter, it is useful to examine
the way these words were defined at the time of the ratification. As
Professor Ramsey recognizes, Samuel Johnson's English dictionary
(widely used at the time) defined "declare" as: "to clear, to free from
obscurity"; "to make known, to tell evidently and openly"; "to publish;
to proclaim"; "to shew in open view"; or "to make a declaration, to
proclaim some resolution or opinion, some favour or opposition."
This definition suggests that declaring war recognized a state of affairs
and clarified the legal status of the United States's relationship with
another country, rather than authorized the steps to create that state
of affairs.
Because he immediately assumes that declaring war means be-
ginning war, Professor Ramsey overlooks the definition of the other
words used in the Constitution itself in regard to war. Recall that Arti-
cle I, Section 10 uses the phrase "engage in War," and Article III uses
"levying War." Johnson, for example, defined "engage" as "to embark
in an affair; to enter in an undertaking," or "to conflict; to fight."'
Johnson defined "levy" as "to raise, applied to war."' Other dictionar-
ies of the period drew a similar distinction between "declare" and
"engage" or "levy." Nathan Bailey's English dictionary defined "de-
clare" as "to make known, to manifest, publish, or shew," while "en-
gage" meant "to encounter or fight," and "levy" to "raise."9 Thomas
Sheridan's dictionary defined declare as "to make known," and engage
as "to conflict, to fight," and levy as "to raise, to bring together men."'
All three defined "commence," as used by the South Carolina consti-
tution, as "to begin." As far as I can determine, no authoritative source
from the framing period defines "declaring war" as commencing or
beginning war, while several sources use other words to convey that
meaning. Thus, the Constitution's use of the words "levy" or "engage
in" war clearly refer to a more active role in warmaking, one more in
line with the authorizing role that Professor Ramsey and others hope
for in Congress. Even today, we commonly think of the statutes that
establish public programs and mandates as "authorization" statutes
(to be followed by appropriations), not "declaring" statutes. A declara-
tion does not authorize or make, it recognizes and proclaims.
Properly understanding the meaning of "declare" also requires an
examination of the founding generation's use of the word in other
88 Samuel Johnson, 1 A Dictionary of the English Language (W. Strahan 1755).
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Nathan Bailey, An Universal Etymological English Dictionary (Neill 24th ed 1782).
92 Thomas Sheridan, A General Dictionary of the English Language (Dodsley 1780).
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contexts. When the Framers employed "declare" in a constitutional
context, they usually used it in a juridical manner, in the sense that
courts "declare" the state of the law or the legal status of a certain
event or situation. An example from early American political history
illustrates this narrower meaning. When considering the meaning of
declaring war, the Framers' thoughts would have turned to their most
significant national legal act, the Declaration of Independence. The
Declaration did not "authorize" military resistance to Great Britain.
At the time that the Continental Congress met at Philadelphia in 1776
to draft the Declaration, hostilities had existed for more than a year,
and Congress had been exercising sovereign powers-negotiating with
Britain, sending representatives abroad, seeking aid-for at least two
years.9 Rather than authorize hostilities, the Declaration recognized
the legal status of the relationship between the mother country and its
former colonies under international law. Thus, the Declaration ap-
pears in the form almost of a complaint, in which the revolutionaries
count their grievances (taxation without representation, suspension of
the laws, use of bench trials), the remedy sought (independence), and
the applicable law ("the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God").
The Declaration of Independence's importance was not in au-
thorizing combat, but in transforming the legal status of the hostilities
between Great Britain and her colonies from an insurrection to a war
between equals. As a historian recently observed in the William and
Mary Quarterly, "[I]n order to turn a civil war into a war between
states, and thus to create legitimate corporate combatants out of indi-
vidual rebels and traitors, it was essential to declare war and to obtain
recognition of the legitimacy of such a declaration."9' Once a nation-
state, the United States could make alliances and conduct commerce
with other nations, which were critical steps in winning independence.
The Declaration of Independence was the nation's first declaration of
war.
93 See David Armitage, The Declaration ofIndependence and International Law, 59 Wm &
Mary Q 39 (2002).
94 See id;Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 246-47 (cited in note 1).
95 Armitage, 59 Wm & Mary Q at 39 (cited in note 93).
96 On a different note, many state constitutions at the time of the framing contained decla-
rations of rights that preceded the articles establishing the powers of the government. See John
C. Yoo, Our Declaratory Ninth Amendment, 42 Emory L J 967,973-78 (1993) (describing decla-
rations of rights in state constitutions before 1789). Unlike the Bill of Rights, these declarations
did more than place limits on the enumerated powers of the government. Rather, they declared
the existence of rights and powers inherent in the people and in individuals. The state declara-
tions did not purport to authorize individual rights on the basis of positive law, but only sought to
identify rights thought to pre-exist constitutional government. Again, a declaration did not cre-
ate, but recognized.
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Professor Ramsey's response appears to be that, under interna-
tional law, declaring war was basically useless. Therefore, the grant of
authority in Article I, Section 8 must be the power to initiate hostili-
ties. There are several problems with this reasoning. First, if Professor
Ramsey is correct, the United States should never have issued a Dec-
laration of Independence; events themselves demonstrated that hos-
tilities had been authorized with the mother country. Nevertheless, the
Declaration mattered because it openly proclaimed that the colonies
had broken away, and it allowed other countries, such as France, to de-
fine their own legal relationships with the new nation. Second, if Pro-
fessor Ramsey is right, the United States should never have taken the
trouble to declare war the few times that it has. In each of the five de-
clared wars, the United States could claim that it, its citizens, or its
forces had been attacked. Third, if Professor Ramsey is to be believed,
no nation should ever declare war, because apparently the launch of
an offensive attack is sufficient to declare war. Yet, the British de-
clared war several times in conflicts preceding the framing period-
even though these declarations often came after hostilities had broken
out."
Declarations of war serve a purpose, albeit one that does not
amount to the sole authority to initiate hostilities. Declarations do
simply what they say they do: they declare. To use the eighteenth-
century understanding, they make public, show openly, and make
known the state of international legal relations between the United
States and another nation.n This is a different concept than whether
the laws of war apply to the hostilities; two nations could technically
not be at war, even though their forces might be engaged in limited
combat. During the eighteenth century, declarations often took the
form of a legal complaint in which a nation identified the grounds for
waging war, explained the new rules that would apply to interaction
between the two nations, and outlined the remedy.9 Declarations are
also important for domestic constitutional purposes. Textually, a decla-
ration of war places the nation in a state of total war, which triggers
enhanced powers on the part of the federal government.' ° Congress
has recognized the distinction between declared total wars and non-
97 See Yoo, 84 Cal L Rev at 214-15 (cited in note 1).
98 Indeed, a full century after the founding, declaration continued to have meaning under
international law. See, for example, Hague Convention (III) Relative to the Opening of Hostili-
ties, art 1, Oct 18, 1907,36 Stat 2259.
99 See id at 215.
100 See, for example, US Const Amend V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger.").
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declared hostilities by providing the executive branch with expanded
domestic powers-such as seizing foreign property, conducting war-
rantless surveillance, arresting enemy aliens, and taking control of
transportation systems, to name a few-only when war is declared.''
Even the Supreme Court has suggested that in times of declared war,
certain actions by the federal government would survive strict scrutiny
but would certainly fail if attempted in peacetime.u
Finally, brief consideration of the interaction between the power
to declare war and the President's powers suggests that Congress can-
not have the sole authority to commence hostilities. Suppose Congress
wanted to engage in war with France against the President's wishes.
Even if Congress were to declare war against France, the President
could still prevent hostilities from breaking out simply by refusing to
order the armed forces to attack. All Congress can do is declare the
state of the legal relationship between the United States and France
under international law. Congress's power to declare war cannot
amount to the sole power to initiate hostilities, because the Com-
mander-in-Chief and Executive Power Clauses provide only the
President with the power to conduct military operations, and thus a
functional veto over any congressional effort to start a war.
III. WAR AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCrURE
Constitutional structure reveals, in even sharper contrast, the
problems with a textualist interpretation of the Declare War Clause
that requires congressional authorization of hostilities. In addition to
ignoring the Constitution's use of "declare," Professor Ramsey fails to
compare the Constitution's allocation of war powers with other provi-
sions that govern the exercise of federal power. According to Profes-
sor Ramsey and other pro-Congress scholars, the Constitution estab-
lishes a strict procedure that requires Congress first to declare or au-
thorize war before the President, as commander-in-chief, can prose-
cute hostilities. Yet, the Constitution itself nowhere describes such a
process, nor does it explain how the Declare War Clause and the
commander-in-chief power must interact. The Framers simply gave
the former to Congress and the latter to the President and left it at
that.
101 See, for example, 50 USC App § 5(b)(1) (1994 & Supp 1999) (seizure of foreign prop-
erty); 50 USC § 1811 (1994) (electronic surveillance), 50 USC § 1829 (1994) (physical searches),
50 USC § 1844 (Supp 1999) (trap and trace devices); 50 USC § 21 (1994) (seizure of aliens); 10
USC § 2644 (1994 & Supp 1996) (seizure of transportation systems).
102 Korematsu v United States, 323 US 214,216 (1944) (upholding racial classifications dur-
ing World War II and noting that "legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial
group" may be justified by "[p]ressing public necessity").
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Although Professor Ramsey's reading fails to provide a text-
based explanation of its Congress-first process, his argument might be
thought of as more of a structural one. He reads the Declare War
Clause to mean more than a power to issue a declaration of war be-
cause otherwise it would impose no substantive limit on the Presi-
dent."3 Implicit in this central idea is that the Constitution's structure
requires that a check on the President's war powers must exist. Ram-
sey's argument, however, misunderstands the nature of the Constitu-
tion's basic structure. Congress needs no check on the President
through the Declare War Clause because it already possesses all the
power .it needs. Congress at any time may use its power of the purse to
counter presidential warmaking. Indeed, all Congress need do is noth-
ing; by refusing actively to authorize the existence of armed forces or
appropriate additional money to fund wars, Congress can prevent the
nation from conducting any effective hostilities. Professor Ramsey and
others seek to infuse an unwarranted meaning in the Declare War
Clause to solve a constitutional problem that is not really there.
A. Reading the Constitution as a Whole
The constitutional text makes apparent that when the Framers
wanted to make legislative participation a constitutional requirement
in the exercise of executive functions, they knew how. For example,
neither Professor Ramsey, other pro-Congress scholars, nor I dispute
that under the British constitution, the power to make war was execu-
tive. Pro-Congress scholars simply believe that the Constitution di-
vided the war power between the President and Congress, with Con-
gress playing the chief role in deciding whether to wage war, and the
President controlling how to wage war. When the Constitution, how-
ever, divides and allocates executive powers in the manner suggested
by Professor Ramsey, it does so far more clearly than the manner in
which it divorced the declare war power from the other executive war
powers. This indicates that the Framers did not intend war powers to
be governed by a specific legalist process akin to others in the Consti-
tution.
The Treaty and Appointments powers provide a useful illustra-
tion of this point. Article II, Section 2, for example, states that the
President "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators pre-
sent concur."" This provision makes clear that the President cannot
make treaties without senatorial consent, and it establishes a mini-
103 See Ramsey, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1600-01 (cited in note 4).
104 US Const Art II, § 2, cl 2.
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mum process for the making of treaties. Similarly, Article II requires
senatorial participation in the making of appointments, another power
that was executive in nature under the British constitution. Section 2
states that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Of-
ficers of the United States."' 05
If the Framers had sought to establish the warmaking system that
Professor Ramsey envisions, why didn't they use the same frame-
work? Article II, Section 2 could have included an additional clause
that the President "shall have Power, by and with the advice and con-
sent of Congress, to engage in War." This would have made clear that
the Constitution requires Congress's permission when beginning mili-
tary hostilities, just as the President now needs senatorial consent be-
fore making treaties or appointing Supreme Court Justices. Instead,
Professor Ramsey and other pro-Congress scholars would have us be-
lieve that the Framers ineptly chose ambiguous, obtuse language to al-
locate war powers in such a manner as to reach the same functional re-
sult as the Treaty and Appointments Clauses. To be sure, these'provi-
sions raise their own interpretive questions, which I have addressed
elsewhere, ' ' but they take the form of crystals of brilliant clarity when
placed besides the war power clauses.
The absence of a textually mandated and defined process for go-
ing to war is especially clear because the Constitution, in other areas,
provides for specific processes when they are wanted. A comparison
to the process for enacting statutes is illustrative. Although one of the
signal defects of the Articles of Confederation was its inability to di-
rectly regulate the private conduct of individuals, the Framers still
sought to render the passage of legislation difficult. Article I, Section 7
thus sets out a finely wrought method for making public laws, with ex-
plicit provisions when the consent of different parties, such as the
President, is required."7 It does not describe the legislature's role in
lawmaking in Article I, and then the President's veto power in Article
II, while leaving blank how the twain shall meet. Similarly, Article V
describes a process for amending the Constitution-one in which
105 Id.
106 See John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution; Treaties; Non-Self-Execution, and the
Original Understanding, 99 Colum L Rev 1955 (1999) (examining whether treaties are non-self-
executing); John C. Yoo, The New Sovereignty and the Old Constitution: The Chemical Weapons
Convention and the Appointments Clause, 15 Const Commentary 87 (1998) (discussing applica-
tion of the appointments clause to international organizations).
107 See generally Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79
Tex L Rev 1321 (2001).
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Congress can exercise the initiative-in which the consent of several
actors is precisely outlined. Contrast this with Professor Ramsey's
process for warmaking, which he believes is just as precise: Congress
must provide a declaration of war (presumably by simple majority
vote) before the President can exercise his commander-in-chief func-
tions on the battlefield. If warmaking were to have such process fea-
tures, involving congressional initiative and consent, we would expect
the constitutional text to establish as detailed a procedure for war-
making as for lawmaking or amending the Constitution. Surely, the
Framers would have thought war to be as important as the latter two
subjects.
B. War Powers and the Structure of the Executive Power
In light of these textual and structural defects with Professor
Ramsey's argument, I think it fair to say that, at best, his argument
amounts to a claim that the Constitution does not clearly allocate the
power to commence war in the President. His resort to the interna-
tional legal scholarship of the eighteenth century constitutes an effort
to show that "declaring war" means more than it appears to mean, and
that the many presidents who have read their textual powers to grant
them the authority to commence military hostilities have been in the
wrong. Yet, even if Professor Ramsey were successful in introducing
doubts into the pro-executive interpretation of the constitutional text,
the deeper design of the Constitution itself requires us to construe any
ambiguities in the scope of the executive power in favor of the Presi-
dent. Several structural features of the Constitution indicate that any
uncertainty in the authority to initiate military hostilities must be re-
solved by vesting those powers in the President.
First, the Constitution secures all federal executive power in the
President to ensure a unity in purpose and energy in action. As Alex-
ander Hamilton famously observed in the Federalist 70, "Decision, ac-
tivity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings
of one man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of
any greater number."' The centralization of authority in the President
is particularly crucial in matters of national defense, war, and foreign
policy, where a unitary executive can evaluate threats, consider policy
choices, and mobilize national resources with a speed and energy that
is far superior to any other branch. As Hamilton noted, "Energy in the
executive is a leading character in the definition of good government.
It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign at-
108 Federalist 70 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed, Federalist Papers at 424 (cited in note 38).
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tacks. ' ' This point applies perhaps most directly in war than in any
other context. Wrote Hamilton: "Of all the cares or concerns of gov-
ernment, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities
which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand.""
Second, the constitutional structure requires that any ambiguities
in the allocation of a power that is executive in nature, such as the
power to conduct military hostilities, must be resolved in favor of the
executive branch. Article II, Section 1 provides that "[t]he executive
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States."" By con-
trast, Article I's Vesting Clause gives Congress only the powers
"herein granted.""2 This difference in language indicates that Con-
gress's legislative powers are limited to the enumeration in Article I,
Section 8, while the President's powers include inherent executive
powers that are unenumerated in the Constitution.
To be sure, Article II lists specifically enumerated powers in addi-
tion to the Vesting Clause, and some have argued that this limits the
"executive Power" granted in the Vesting Clause to the powers on that
list."3 But the purpose of the enumeration of executive powers in Arti-
cle II was not to define and cabin the grant in the Vesting Clause.
Rather, the Framers redirected some elements of powers of the execu-
tive power to Congress in Article I, while expressly maintaining other
elements as enumerated executive powers in Article II. Hence, for ex-
ample, they gave the King's traditional power to declare war to Con-
gress under Article I, while the commander-in-chief authority was ex-
pressly reserved for the President in Article II. Furthermore, the
Framers altered other plenary powers of the King, such as treaties and
appointments, assigning the Senate a share of them in Article II it-
sell.4 Thus, the enumeration in Article II marks the places where sev-
109 Id at 423.
110 Federalist 74 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed, Federalist Papers at 447 (cited in note 38).
James Iredel (later an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) argued in the North Carolina
Ratifying Convention that "[f]rom the nature of the thing, the command of armies ought to be
delegated to one person only. The secrecy, despatch, and decision, which are necessary in military
operations, can only be expected from one person" Elliot, ed, 4 Debates at 107 (cited in note 45).
See also Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 546-47 (Carolina
1987) (stating that in military matters, "[u]nity of plan, promptitude, activity, and decision, are in-
dispensable to success; and these can scarcely exist, except when a single magistrate is entrusted
exclusively with the power").
111 US Const Art II, § 1, cl 1.
112 US ConstArt I, § 1.
113 See, for example, A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency's New Vestments, 88 Nw
U L Rev 1346,1362-66 (1994) (rejecting the argument that Congress lacks constitutional author-
ity to restrict the President's power over executive branch officials).
114 Thus, Article II's enumeration of the Treaty and Appointments Clauses only dilutes the
unitary nature of the executive branch in regard to the exercise of those powers, rather than
transforming them into quasi-legislative functions. See Yoo, 99 Colum L Rev at 2233-34 (cited in
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eral traditional executive powers were diluted or reallocated. The
Vesting Clause, however, conveyed all other unenumerated executive
powers to the President. As Alexander Hamilton famously argued in
the Helvidius-Pacificus debates, "The general doctrine of our Consti-
tution, then is, that the executive power of the nation is vested in the
President; subject only to the exceptions and qualifications which are
expressed in the instrument."' 5
There can be little doubt that the decision to deploy military
force is "executive" in nature and was traditionally regarded as such.
It calls for action and energy in execution, rather than the deliberate
formulation of rules to govern the conduct of private individuals.
Moreover, the Framers understood it to be an attribute of the execu-
tive. "The direction of war implies the direction of the common
strength," wrote Hamilton, "and the power of directing and employing
the common strength forms a usual and essential part in the definition
of the executive authority.' 16 As a result, to the extent that the consti-
tutional text does not explicitly allocate the power to initiate military
hostilities to a particular branch, the Vesting Clause provides that it
remain among the President's unenumerated powers in foreign affairs.
Hamilton's argument about the Vesting Clause should not be surpris-
ing to Professor Ramsey, who, when writing with Sai Prakash in other
areas of foreign affairs law, has heavily relied upon it.'1 7 In areas such
as treaty termination, for example, Professor Ramsey (with Professor
Prakash) has been only all too willing to embrace the notion of un-
enumerated executive foreign affairs powers."8 Yet, on the question of
war powers he inexplicably reverses the polarity of the constitutional
structure to claim that the text hems in the President. A consistent ap-
proach to the constitutional structure and executive power in foreign
affairs ought to find presidential authority both to initiate military
hostilities and to terminate treaties.' 9
Third, depriving the President of the power to decide when to use
military force would disrupt the basic constitutional framework for
the conduct of foreign relations. From the beginning of the Republic,
the vesting of the executive, commander-in-chief, and treaty powers in
note 16).
115 Pacificus No 1, in Henry Cabot Lodge, ed, 4 Works ofAlexander Hamilton 432,439 (G..
Putnam's Sons 1904), quoted in Myers v United States; 272 US 52,138-39 (1926).
116 Federalist 74 (Hamilton) at 447 (cited in note 110).
117 See generally Prakash and Ramsey, 111 Yale L J at 256-61 (cited in note 75).
118 See id at 264-65,324-27 (describing examples of such powers).
119 On this question, at least, my positions have the virtue of remaining consistent. See John
Yoo, Politics as Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of Powers; and Treaty In-
terpretation, 89 Cal L Rev 851,869-77 (2001) (stating that the President has plenary authority to
terminate, suspend, or interpret treaties).
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the executive branch has been understood as granting the President
plenary control over the conduct of foreign relations. As Secretary of
State Thomas Jefferson observed during the first Washington admini-
stration: "The constitution has divided the powers of government into
three branches [and] has declared that 'the executive powers shall be
vested in the president,' submitting only special articles of it to a nega-
tive by the senate."m Due to this structure, Jefferson continued, "[t]he
transaction of business with foreign nations is executive altogether; it
belongs, then, to the head of that department, except as to such por-
tions of it as are specially submitted to the senate. Exceptions are to
be construed strictly."12' In defending President Washington's authority
to issue the Neutrality Proclamation, Hamilton came to the same in-
terpretation of the President's foreign affairs powers. According to
Hamilton, Article II "ought ... to be considered as intended ... to
specify the principal articles implied in the definition of executive
power; leaving the rest to flow from the general grant of that power.'"
As future Chief Justice John Marshall famously declared a few years
later, "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external rela-
tions, and its sole representative with foreign nations.... The [execu-
tive] department ... is entrusted with the whole foreign intercourse of
the nation. ' 2' Given this agreement, it has not been difficult for the
executive branch consistently to assert the President's plenary author-
ity in foreign affairs ever since.
A final structural point is worth emphasizing. Much of the sup-
port for broadly interpreting the power to declare war, it seems to me,
arises out of concerns about unchecked presidential warmaking. In
Professor Ramsey's view, for example, the Declare War Clause must
encompass the power to commence hostilities, because otherwise it
would impose no substantive limit on the President." Professor Ram-
sey's argument tries to show that declarations of war are so meaning-
less that the Constitution's reference to them must portend some
greater power-even if that power is not borne by the text's actual
meaning. Thus, like other pro-Congress scholars before him, Professor
Ramsey seeks to convert declaring war, which specifically functioned
under international law to determine the legal status of hostilities, into
a domestic legal check on the executive branch. Otherwise, Congress
simply cannot control the President!
120 Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Powers of the Senate (1790), in Paul L. Ford, ed, 5 The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 161 (G.E Putnam's Sons 1895).
121 Id.
122 Pacificus No 1, in Lodge, ed, 4 Alexander Hamilton at 439 (cited in note 115)
123 10 Annals of Congress 613-14 (Gales and Seaton 1851).
124 See Ramsey, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1600-01 (cited in note 4).
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Such concerns, however, misunderstand the Constitution's grants
of power to Congress in war matters, which give it an effective role in
the commencement of military hostilities. Congress, for example, has
the sole authority to "raise and support Armies," to "provide and
maintain a Navy," and to "make Rules for the Government and Regu-
lation of the land and naval Forces..'. Without the legislative estab-
lishment and funding of the armed forces, presidents have no weapons
with which to wage war. The appropriations power and the power to
raise the military give Congress a sufficient check on presidential
warmaking, a concept that the Framers well understood. In fact, in the
America of the late eighteenth century, presidents did not enjoy the
resources to commence meaningful hostilities on their own. After the
peace with Great Britain, the United States did not immediately main-
tain a large peacetime army or navy and did not really do so until the
Cold War. In the nation's first military conflict under the Constitution,
President Washington continually had to seek congressional funding
for campaigns against Indian tribes.'2 In fighting the Quasi-War with
France (the nation's first war against a European nation under the
Constitution, which, incidentally, was not accompanied by a declara-
tion of war even though the United States had not been attacked),
President Adams had to seek congressional approval for a navy and
army with which to conduct hostilities.'27 In the course of approving
these measures, Congress fully discussed the merits of the wars, and it
easily could have prevented the commencement of hostilities simply
by refusing to appropriate anything.
This pattern has been repeated in our recent modern wars. In the
war against the al Qaeda terrorist organization and the Taliban militia
in Afghanistan, for example, President George W. Bush sought addi-
tional funding for military operations, giving Congress the opportunity
to oppose hostilities.n Similarly, in 1999 President Clinton sought
emergency funding for military operations in Kosovo and Serbia.'29 In
both cases, Congress could have effectively blocked the conduct of
hostilities by refusing to appropriate the funds. Professor Ramsey's
125 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 12-14.
126 See Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military
Establishment in America, 1783-1802 97-98,110-11,120-24 (Free Press 1975).
127 See Alexander DeConde, The Quasi-War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared
War with France 1797-1801 90-96 (Charles Scribner's Sons 1966).
128 See Kathy A. Gambrell, Bush to Seek $48 Billion for Defense, United Press International
(January 23,2002), available online at <http://www.lexis.com> (last visited Oct 2,2002) (explain-
ing details of Bush's requests for more money for the fight against terrorism).
129 See Yoo, 148 U Pa L Rev at 1681 (cited in note 1) ("Congress doubled the Administra-
tion's request for emergency funding for .Yugoslavia war operations, to the tune of $11.8 billion,
but did not authorize the war.").
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structural argument-that the Declare War Clause must give the
power to Congress to decide whether to commence hostilities, because
otherwise it would give Congress no check on the President-simply
looks for the answer in the wrong places. There is no doubt that the
Constitution provides Congress with a powerful check on warmaking,
but it comes through the authority to grant or deny funds to wage war.
This Part has described the textual and structural problems with
Professor Ramsey's approach. Professor Ramsey's fundamental prob-
lem is that his narrow focus on the Declare War Clause ignores clear
signs in the constitutional text and structure that the President enjoys
significant initiative in warmaking. Tellingly, Professor Ramsey pro-
vides no textual or historical interpretation of the Commander-in-
Chief or Executive Power Clauses, which provide a vast reservoir of
authority for presidents in foreign affairs and national security. Fur-
ther, he ignores other constitutional provisions in which the Framers
demonstrated that they understood "declaring war" as far narrower
than "conducting war," a distinction further illuminated by the com-
mon understanding of "declare" in the mid-eighteenth century. He
also cannot explain why the Framers refused to follow clear models in
the text of the Articles of Confederation, the state constitutions, and
the Constitution itself that would have clearly and unambiguously re-
quired legislative consent for the initiation of hostilities. Finally, his
approach directly conflicts with the Constitution's structure, which
creates a system that was not to be subject to a strict, legalistic process
and in which the executive branch was to enjoy any unenumerated
foreign affairs and national security powers.
CONCLUSION
This Response sought to accomplish two missions. First, it at-
tempted to demonstrate that Professor Ramsey's use of history suffers
from significant flaws. His effort to show that the Framers understood
the phrase "declaring war" as vesting Congress with the sole power to
begin military hostilities did not use history in the right way, took the
wrong lessons from the relevant primary sources, and failed to take
account of the historical works on early American constitutional de-
velopment. Second, this Response has sought to distill the textual and
structural arguments in favor of a flexible approach to war powers.
Careful examination of the central provisions involved, other relevant
texts, and the constitutional structure shows that the Constitution does
not mandate a specific, legalistic process for waging war. Instead, the
Constitution vests the executive and legislative branches with differ-
ent powers involving war, which the President and Congress may use
to cooperate or to compete. The flexibility of the constitutional
framework for warmaking becomes clear when compared to, for ex-
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ample, the Constitution's procedures for enacting a statute, ratifying a
treaty, or appointing officers of the United States. If the Framers had
intended the Constitution to impose the strict process demanded by
Professor Ramsey and other pro-Congress scholars, they would have
employed the more detailed mechanisms and language that they used
elsewhere.
While the debate over war powers is of great intellectual interest,
it is important to remember that it has significant practical implica-
tions as well. Professor Ramsey's approach, like that of other pro-
Congress scholars, has three primary effects on the conduct for
American national security in the modem world. First, a legalistic sys-
tem that requires congressional authorization of all hostilities would
find many, if not most, wars waged since the dawn of the atomic age
(and before) to be unconstitutional. Under Professor Ramsey's theory,
conflicts ranging from the Korean War in 1950 to the intervention in
Kosovo in 1999 flatly violated the Constitution due to the lack of con-
gressional authorization for the hostilities. Given the imperatives for
quick and decisive military action in the modem world, and Con-
gress's demonstrated preference to allow the President to lead, it
seems unlikely that this practice will change. Professor Ramsey and
his colleagues, therefore, seek to overthrow the operating system of
war powers that has been in existence since at least the end of World
War II, with the acquiescence of the three branches of government.
Moreover, Professor Ramsey's theory renders trivial those times
that the nation has taken the serious step of declaring war. In all five
of our declared wars, the United States could make a strong case that
it was attacked. According to Professor Ramsey, in such cases a decla-
ration of war is wholly unnecessary. Indeed, under Professor Ramsey's
approach, the presidents and Congresses have behaved rather per-
versely over the last two centuries, by declaring war when they didn't
need to and failing to declare war when they did.
Second, Professor Ramsey, like other pro-Congress scholars, must
admit that his approach contemplates a dramatic expansion of the ju-
dicial role in foreign affairs. If the President orders military hostilities
without congressional authorization, then he has violated the Consti-
tution, and presumably a properly situated plaintiff-such as a reserv-
ist called to duty-could bring a challenge in federal court to a war.
Judicial intervention in war would have two obviously deleterious ef-
fects. It would seriously undermine the ability of the President to pro-
tect the national security-imagine the consequences if the President
were constantly forced to await judicial resolution of a case before us-
ing force abroad to protect the nation's interest. A broader judicial
role in warmaking also would threaten defiance of the federal courts;
if there ever were a situation in which a President would feel the need
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to disregard a judicial order, it would be in a case in which he believed
his actions were necessary to protect the nation with military force.
And it goes without saying that Professor Ramsey's theory would foist
upon the federal courts a job that they do not want-witness the D.C.
Circuit's recent holding that the constitutionality of the Kosovo war
was nonjusticiablem
Third, Professor Ramsey and other pro-Congress scholars would
impose upon the country a strict, legalistic process for making war
precisely at a time when utmost flexibility is required. Forcing presi-
dents to receive congressional authorization before using force would
seriously hamper the nation as it confronts the unprecedented chal-
lenges posed by terrorist organizations and rogue nations. According
to Professor Ramsey's approach, for example, American attacks
against terrorists, when not authorized by statute, would fall afoul of
the Constitution. Thus, President Reagan's strike on Libya in 1986,
and President Clinton's missile attack on Sudan and Afghanistan tar-
gets in 1998 were illegal and, one imagines, possibly subject to judicial
injunction or damages. This view would place serious restrictions on
the United States's ability to respond to the terrorist attacks of Sep-
tember 11, 2001. Although Congress has approved the use of force-
though not declared war-against those connected with the Septem-
ber 11 attacks,3' it has not provided legislative authorization for mili-
tary attacks against terrorist groups unconnected with the September
11 attacks, or the nations that harbor them. Thus, even if the President
believes certain terrorist groups and rogue nations pose a future
threat to the United States by, for example, attempting to acquire
weapons of mass destruction, Professor Ramsey and others would
prevent him from attacking such potential enemies unless Congress
declared war or the United States suffered an attack first. One can
only imagine the advantage that terrorists or rogue nations would
draw from public congressional deliberations, which might give them
the advance notice of a possible attack necessary to conceal their
forces or disperse their weapons facilities.
Properly understood, the Constitution does not require such a re-
sult. As this Response has demonstrated, the Constitution's text and
structure allow a flexible system of war powers in which the President
can seize the initiative to wage war, subject to congressional control
over funding. It is a system that not only has proven stable for at least
the last half-century, if not before, but one that empowers the nation
to take the measures necessary to fight the new type of war that was
130 See Campbell v Clinton, 203 F3d 19,25 (DC Cir 2000).
131 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub L No 107-40,115 Stat 224 (2001).
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thrust upon it on September 11, 2001. Instead of using the Constitu-
tion to fight the last war, we should understand that the Constitution
allows us to respond to the next.
